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POLITICS OF HUNGER IN THE SUDAN

JOINT HEARING

BEFORE THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER

AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FIRST CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, MARCH 2, 1989

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CONTENTS

Page

Hearing held in Washington, DC, March 2, 1989 1

Statement of:
- Ackerman, Hon. Gary L., a Representative in Congress from the State of New York, opening statement of 5
- Brown, Kenneth L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, U.S. Department of State 22
- Burkhalter, Holly, Washington representative, Human Rights Watch 15
- Leland, Hon. Mickey, a Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, opening statement of 3
- Taft, Julia Vadala, Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, accompanied by Larry Saiers, Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development 24
- Winter, Roger P., Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees 11
- Wolf, Hon. Frank R., a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Virginia 7
- Wolpe, Hon. Howard, a Representative in Congress from the State of Michigan, opening statement of 1

Prepared statements, letters, supplemental material, et cetera:
- Brown, Kenneth L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa, U.S. Department of State, prepared statement of 87
- Burkhalter, Holly, Africa Watch, Human Rights Watch, prepared statement of 70
- Dorgan, Hon. Byron L., a Representative in Congress from the State of North Dakota, prepared statement of 46
- Emerson, Hon. Bill, a Representative in Congress from the State of Missouri, prepared statement of 48
- Prendergast, John, policy analyst, Center of Concern/Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa before the Subcommittee on Africa, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, February 23, 1989, prepared statement of 116
- Taft, Julia Vadala, Director, Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development, prepared statement of 97
- Winter, Roger P., Director, U.S. Committee for Refugees:
  - Norwegian People's Aid, fax transmission, dated March 1, 1989 69
  - Prepared statement of 62
- Wolf, Hon. Frank R., a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of Virginia:
  - Prepared statement of 50
  - Sudan, observations and recommendations by 55

POLITICS OF HUNGER IN THE SUDAN

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 1989

House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Hunger and the Subcommittee
on Africa of the Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.

The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 11:08 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mickey Leland [chairman of the Select Committee on Hunger] and Hon. Howard Wolpe [chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa] presiding.

Members present: Representatives Leland, Wolpe, Ackerman, Hall, Brennan, Fazio, Espy, Crockett, Emerson, Smith, and Payne.

Also present: Representative Wolf.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD WOLPE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

Mr. Wolpe. The hearing will come to order.

It is a late moment in the tragedy that is underway in Sudan since civil war resumed there in 1983. Hundreds of thousands of innocent southern Sudanese died needless and horrible deaths in 1988 due to civil war and a tendency on both sides of the conflict to use food as a weapon. Similar numbers died in previous years, bringing the total to an estimated—and almost unimaginable—1 million.

In 1988, the prospects for peace brightened considerably with the signing of the peace accord between the government affiliated Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the southern insurgents, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA). However, these hopes dissipated in December when Prime Minister Sadiq Al Mahdi failed to embrace this blueprint for peace and instead clung, as he apparently still does today, to the belief that a solution to Sudan's humanitarian and political crisis rests not in negotiation but in appeals for greater military flows from such countries as Libya.

In the meantime, the war has dragged on. The SPLA has seized more ground and grown more preoccupied with military objectives potentially weakening their interest in a negotiated peace which could best salvage what is left of southern Sudanese society.

In the north the Sudanese Government, due to its intransigence, has alienated and exasperated all but a few interests. Unions, professionals, several major political parties from north and south, and, in recent days, the military command have united in calling for the immediate implementation of the peace accord's cease-fire, a freeze upon the imposition or revision of Sharia law, and a constitutional conference. Yet peace has not come and emergency relief efforts remain stalled in many critical areas. As a consequence, 1989 looks bleak. The prospects are extremely high that once again thousands upon thousands of innocent southern Sudanese will perish.

It is important to emphasize that not just the Government of Sudan and the SPLA have failed. There has been a tragic failure to act at other levels. The international community has been exceedingly cautious and timorous. That is true of western donor countries, of major moderate Arab friends of Sudan, of private and voluntary organizations, and of international organizations. It is also true of the United States. Until very recently, our policy has been one of quiet diplomacy marked by an unquestioning faith in the integrity and motivations of the Sudanese Government. This approach has proved ineffectual and increasingly untenable on both political and moral grounds. Over the past 2 years the worst conceivable outcome which the United States has desired to prevent by it's low key approach, has in fact largely materialized.

In the meantime the United States has demonstrated a tragic hesitation to pursue aggressively all options to deliver relief to the south. Too often, it seems in retrospect, we have been fearful of antagonizing a government which, as the State Department's own human rights report document indicates, has shown a perverse disregard for the fate of it's southern citizens. Too often, we have been slow and reluctant to apply overt, sustained and multilateral diplomatic pressures upon the government of the Sudan and the SPLA. This is at a time when our potential leverage was indeed increasing.

Moderate Arab States, multilateral development institutions, and European donors have all backed away from Sudan, increasing its isolation and the economic and political pressure it feels.

There are some harsh and brutal lessons in what has happened and what will likely continue to happen in Sudan.

Fortunately, in the past month we have seen evidence of a willingness on the part of the new Bush administration to register overtly the United States' abhorrence toward what is taking place in Sudan, to make clear that a vast share of responsibility lies at the door of the Sudanese Government, and to signal its intentions to proceed aggressively to see that relief reaches the hundreds of thousands of imperiled Sudanese in SPLA territory via cross-border deliveries.

Next week a United Nations-sponsored conference in Khartoum will, I hope, result in significant improvements in the delivery of emergency relief to the south. I welcome these changes.

Secretary of State Baker and Julia Taft, director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), each deserve high praise and support from the Congress and elsewhere for the attention they have devoted to Sudan.

So, too, should Congressman Frank Wolf, who is here with us today, be commended for journeying personally to SPLA territory and to Khartoum to learn first hand what is taking place. Congressman Ackerman and Senator Kennedy also deserve our appreciation for formulating a joint resolution on the Sudan which sets out Congress' concerns. That resolution has drawn strong bipartisan support. At the conclusion of today's hearing, the Africa Subcommittee will mark it up and report it out.

All of these steps by the administration, the Congress, and the media as well, which has shown an intense interest in the Sudan, give some measure of new hope. Yet at this critical moment, when the fate of the Sudanese Government hangs in the balance and the rains that interfere with distribution of relief supplies are but a few weeks away, I fear we may not act boldly enough to carry out our emerging new policy toward Sudan.

For me the key questions in this hearing today are very simple. The answers will perhaps save hundreds of thousands of lives.

First, what is the administration prepared to do diplomatically in conjunction with our friends in Europe, Egypt and Saudi Arabia to press the Sudan Government to implement the peace accord?

Second, what is the anticipated number of people at risk of starvation in the coming months and what are we and other donors prepared to do and in what timeframe to meet these urgent needs?

During the past several months of congressional involvement in the issue of the Sudan, the work of the Africa Subcommittee has been undertaken jointly with the Select Committee on Hunger.

My cochairman of this hearing is Congressman Mickey Leland. I wish to take this opportunity to express my deep appreciation to you, Mickey, for the tremendous job that has been done by your subcommittee.

If I may I would like to take this opportunity to say a word about someone who is going to be leaving your subcommittee; I know that this is the source of enormous regret on your part: Jeff Clark. Jeff Clark has headed up the international division of the Select Committee on Hunger and is about to leave the Hunger Committee to take a position with President Carter, in which he will participate in the organization of a major conference on hunger in Africa. Jeff has facilitated a lot of the work that has prompted today's hearing as well as previous hearings that we have held on this subject. I have worked with him on many other issues over the last several years. It has been an enormous pleasure and privilege to have been associated with Jeff. I will miss him on the Hill and I think his departure will leave a major void in this institution. I thank him for all of his efforts.

I would like now to yield to my cochairman, Mr. Leland.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICKEY LELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Chairman LELAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me also lend my words to your statement about Jeff. Jeff has been associated with international issues as the senior staff person for the International Task Force for several years. He has done a yeoman's job in making sure that the voice of the Select Committee on Hunger has been heard throughout the world where hunger has been raised as an issue. I am so pleased that we have had the opportunity to have him with us.

At the same time, he is not leaving the issue of hunger. He will be joining the Carter Center. He was asked to develop a forum for the Presidential Center specifically dealing with the issues of hunger and malnutrition on the continent of Africa.

I know that we are very pleased and very proud of the work that Jeff has done and will continue to do. Jeff, we will miss you.

This being your last hearing, we think it is most appropriate to your service for the Congress on the kind of work that you have accomplished. Congratulations for your new position and we will indeed miss you.

I would like to welcome you to this joint hearing on the Select Committee on Hunger and the Africa Subcommittee hearing on this grave subject. It is always a pleasure to work with Chairman Wolpe. He and I are not only colleagues but classmates in the Congress. During the 10 years that we have been working together, we have been able to accomplish many things.

I will never forget the first congressional trip that I took in 1983 when we visited so many different African nations. I believe we spent about 21 days on the continent of Africa and it was one of the most grueling experiences I have ever had. I must say though it was also the most eye-opening experience and it gave me a rededication to working for the humanity of people everywhere.

We find ourselves related and trying to do something hopefully to open not only the eyes of the Congress but the eyes of the American people about the horror of what is going on in Sudan. Hopefully, we will come to some resolve about what we need to do.

Chairman Wolpe has the primary responsibility of doing what is necessary to give Congress a voice through legislation and otherwise for what needs to be done in areas like Sudan and other parts of Africa. For the privilege of serving as his cochair today, I am very pleased.

Let me take this opportunity to thank today's witnesses in advance of their testimony. We appreciate everyone's efforts to make this hearing as productive and informative as possible.

We are here today to look at a grave situation which threatens the lives of hundreds of thousands of Sudanese civilians caught in a vise between opposing forces and a struggle not of their making. Civil war, religious and ethnic strife, the reckless arming of mercenaries and bandits, and a disregard for the concept of safe passage of relief convoys have created a desperate situation.

Since the conflict first erupted in 1983, perhaps 1 million civilians have perished. Last year, the estimates are that some 250,000 or more Sudanese escaping the conflict starved to death. These victims were largely children. The dimensions of the Sudanese famine are now widely known.

Unlike last July, when the committee last visited this question—since that hearing Mr. Roger Winter, of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, has twice traveled to affected areas of southern Sudan. Media coverage of the tragedy has expanded dramatically. Two congressional staff delegations, one representing the Select Committee on Hunger and the Foreign Affairs Committee in the House, the other the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Affairs of the Judiciary Committee, have documented the horrible fate awaiting so many innocent victims of the Sudanese civil conflict.

Most recently, our colleague from Virginia Representative Frank Wolf spent the January break visiting the Sudan, working tirelessly on the problem. That, may I say, speaks very loudly of Frank's humanitarian impulses. Congressman Wolf, like all of those who have seen these hungry children, has returned determined to alter the situation. That is why we are here today.

Neither Chairman Wolpe nor I are under any illusions that we can quickly or easily alter the situation on the ground in the southern Sudan from Washington. We have been determined that U.S. Government policy, a policy somewhat less than noble on several accounts regarding the Sudan crisis, change.

I can still remember the words of Congressman Ackerman from last July's hearing when he asked if the United States will be regarded as an accomplice, not an active accomplice perhaps, in allowing the policy of using food as a weapon to kill so many innocent people in the Sudan. The question was based on concern that the State Department was mysteriously silent about the Government of Sudan's clear and repeated efforts to deny food to many of the hungry. The question was based on concern that we did not appear to be doing what we could to get food behind the battle lines to reach a large segment of the affected population. That was the further concern of what efforts if any the U.S. Government was making to broker a peace process in Sudan. Everyone knows that there must be peace in this country if this famine is to end. These concerns are precisely what we are addressing today.

I am pleased and would like to repeat the notation of Chairman Wolpe. That it seems the Bush administration is expressing a lot more concern than was realized in the past administration. I am very happy to acknowledge this. I would hope that we can come to some resolve both cooperatively with the Congress and the administration.

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would now like to invite Mr. Wolf to come forward and be our first witness this morning.

Let me also invite any other members on the panel who care to make opening statements to do so at this point.

Mr. Ackerman.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. I would like to thank both of our chairmen this morning for conducting the first hearing, I believe, of the Subcommittee on Africa and the Select Committee on Hunger of the 101st Congress on the issue of Sudan. It gives the issue the kind of priority that it deserves and it demonstrates the commitment of both of the chairmen to the cause of alleviating suffering.

I would especially like to thank Chairman Wolpe for the opportunity to mark up the resolution later this morning and for his expertise in helping to draft it.

The resolution does enjoy bipartisan support including many members of both the subcommittee and the select committee. To bring people up to date, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee did pass a similar resolution on Tuesday.

I'm not going to go through statistics and count the bodies of dead children, the refugees, and all those who have died needlessly. I'm going to leave that to some of the experts that we have here today. The statistics are shocking and they are really very incomprehensible. I don't understand how it is really possible in a country where there appears to be enough food, for a quarter to a half a million people to starve. What I would hope that this hearing would address is why this famine happened and what we will do to prevent it from happening again during the year 1989.

We understand the rains are going to begin in May and I would like to find out what our plans are for getting food out to these people during the next 8 weeks. We have made mistakes before, despite the warnings in the summer and the staff delegation in October. Our Government unfortunately has still remained largely silent. We didn't criticize or push Khartoum to allow for any massive relief. We share in the guilt of 1988. I would like to know what it is we learned from our mistakes.

I think we have to commend the Bush administration for some of its positive initiatives. On February 8th, the statement by Secretary Baker about plans for cross-border food from Kenya seems to be an important change from the previous administration. I hope that they are going to have an effect on the ground. I hope that we don't have in effect statements that are gentler because death is just as brutal and doesn't get any kinder because of statements.

I did ask, as Mickey pointed out, last time that when the history of this final episode is written: would we be viewed upon as passive participants? I think if the Bible was written today, certainly this massive starvation would be deserving of a chapter. I don't know what would be written of us who sat silently by.

There was a time on this planet not too many years ago when millions of people also died and the world sat idly by pretending that it didn't know. Millions of people starved and were put to death. People had excuses then: nobody knew about it. Well the media and these hearings have disabused us of that excuse. The questions remain: are we going to continue to sin by our silence and are we going to be regarded as accomplices in genocide? I would hope that today we may find the beginnings of the answers to those questions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman.

Do any other members have any opening remarks they would care to make?

If not, we will turn to our first witness this morning. Mr. Wolf, I am delighted to welcome you before the committee and as I said the other day on the House floor I was most appreciative of the efforts you have already undertaken by your personal visit to the region and by your public response to what you saw and learned in the course of that experience. I think it has been enormously helpful to have your perceptions laid upon the record in expanding the awareness of this institution and the public. I look forward to receiving your testimony this morning.

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Mr. WOLF. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you personally for having this hearing because it will really make a big, big difference. Therefore, I want to thank you for all the help and work that you have done on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify here this morning. As you know, in January I traveled to northern and southern Sudan as well as Ethiopia in order to gain a full understanding of how famine conditions there were affecting that region of Africa. The images I saw were the same images that haunted millions of Americans during the Ethiopian famine in 1985. In fact, I went to Ethiopia in late 1984 because I talked to Tony Hall when he had returned and became interested. The images in Sudan are exactly the same as the scenes that everyone saw in 1984 and 1985 in Ethiopia. The two differ, however, in a very important way—the tragedy in Sudan is caused by civil war and the use of food as a weapon by opposing sides. The Ethiopian famine was the result of natural phenomena.

The tragedy in Sudan is one that should concern all Americans and I congratulate your efforts, Mr. Wolpe and Mr. Leland, in holding this hearing to focus attention in Congress and in the country on the suffering and death taking place even as we speak today in Sudan.

Clearly through your efforts and the efforts of Senator Simon and his committee in the Senate, more people will begin to take notice of Sudan and its problems.

Before I begin to discuss my trip to Sudan and some of my observations, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one additional comment.

In Soviet Armenia, between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in early December as a result of a tragic earthquake. Nearly constant television and newspaper coverage moved people throughout the world who contributed time, money, and resources to help those who were suffering. In fact, Tom Brokaw thought it was such an important issue that he flew to Soviet Armenia and anchored the NBC Nightly News from there. This was an appropriate response that reflected compassion and understanding of those in the United States and in the Western World.

But in Sudan, some 500,000 and perhaps as many as a million people, the equivalent of the entire population of the city of Pittsburgh plus 75,000 more, died during 1988 as a result of the famine and very few have taken notice. Except for a few newspapers like the Atlanta Constitution, the Washington Post and a handful of others, there have been few news stories. The electronic media have largely ignored this tragedy. Perhaps if there were more news stories and more coverage, more efforts would be aimed at helping the people in both northern and southern Sudan. Had it not been for the World Vision Twin Otter taking that BBC crew up in Ethiopia in 1984, perhaps the world would not have seen that either. For some reason, this story has not made it into the news.

With the chairman's permission, rather than using the committee's time reciting what I saw in the Sudan, I would like to insert in the record a report I prepared which details my observations. Suffice to say that the conditions I witnessed were terrible and the suffering immense.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Without objection.

[The report referred to above appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Mr. **Wolf**. The Bush administration has shown a deep sensitivity to the problems in Sudan. When I briefed Secretary of State James Baker on my trip to Sudan, just days after he was sworn in, he was well versed about the political and relief situation. I might say he was very, very concerned about the problem.

He quickly dealt with the problem by issuing a strong statement calling on the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to ensure that food reaches people in all parts of Sudan. The statement also called for an early cease-fire to promote peace and allow relief to reach those in need.

Most recently, the United States has provided food and supplies for cross-border operations into southern Sudan. I hope that it will do much, much more.

In response to the administration's actions the Sudanese Embassy announced recently that some 2,800 tons of relief materials have been delivered to towns in southern Sudan since January and 61 barges loaded with relief supplies are enroute to Malakal, an area deeply affected by the famine.

In addition, the Sudanese Government has indicated a willingness to seek peace. We must make sure that everything possible is done to ensure that this willingness follows through not just with verbal comments but with an actual peace, a cease-fire and plenty of food for the people that are hungry.

These are very positive steps which have undoubtedly helped to relieve the suffering of thousands of Sudanese and will undoubtedly save the lives of many thousand more in the coming year.

I believe the Bush administration has a unique opportunity to influence the peace process in Sudan. Peace is the one missing link that will eliminate the crisis in Sudan that threatens so many thousands of people.

With all of the positive steps that have been taken thus far, a cease-fire agreement which opens the roads and allows the free passage of food in both northern and southern Sudan could be the step that ensures there is little or no famine in Sudan in 1989. Hundreds of thousands of lives again would be saved.

I have recommended to the administration that the United States appoint an individual with a thorough understanding of Africa and its politics—a peace envoy of sorts—to negotiate between both sides of the Sudanese conflict in order to achieve a cease-fire and open roads policy that will allow food, medicine, and supplies to reach all parts of Sudan.

Such an appointment and a public appointment will send a powerful message to the world and the people of Sudan that the United States is committed to preventing a humanitarian disaster of the type that occurred in Sudan last year. More importantly, it would provide the framework for the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to begin to iron out their differences. This could only lead to improved conditions for all people in Sudan both in the north as well as the south.

I sensed during my visit, Mr. Chairman, that the people of Sudan, from both the north and the south, both Moslem and Christian, all parties, all walks of life, are very, very tired of the fighting. They are realizing and are beginning to recognize that the war, which costs the Government of Sudan about $1 million a day, is the cause of many of that nation's problems—the starvation, no electricity, poor health conditions, very little food, no wheat, nothing works—and they are beginning to say I know why things are so bad in downtown Khartoum because that war is going on and it's beginning to affect my life. I think they are really ready to do something positive because everybody in the country is very, very fed up.

Last, Mr. Chairman, I recommend and urge that the U.S. Government ask the Soviet Union to urge the SPLA to reach a cease-fire agreement with the Government of Sudan. The Soviet Union has a close relationship with Ethiopia and Ethiopia serves as a base for SPLA activities. Soviet influence on the SPLA combined with constructive U.S. intervention in the form of a peace negotiator could have dramatic benefits in reaching a cease-fire accord in time to avoid the tragedy that will come with the rainy season in April.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Sudan is changing rapidly. Earlier this week Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq Mahdi told parliament that he would resign unless the armed forces allowed him to form a new government to work for peace in Sudan.

"The objective is peace, and peace will be easier to achieve if we rally around it at home."

These changes are the result of action by many different people and many different organizations. This hearing will have a positive effect. Roger Winter's work with the U.S. Committee for Refugees has had a positive effect. The staff delegation fact-finding trip to that region with Jeff Clark, Steve Morrison, Ann Schonfield, and David Lonie has had a positive effect. The efforts of the Bush administration has also had a positive effect.

My closing comment is that the key, however, to a long-term solution is peace and I think that is what we should be working for.

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wolf appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 50.]

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Wolf.

The observation that you made early in your testimony pointing to the contrast between the treatment of the tragedy in the Sudan and the tragedy in southern Armenia I think is really on target. It's extraordinary how relatively little emphasis has been given by the media to a situation in which the numbers of people impacted are even greater than what occurred in Soviet Armenia.

I wish it were possible for every member of this body and for many other Americans to personally deal with what you saw in the Sudan and what Congressmen Mickey Leland, Gary Ackerman, Tony Hall, a number of other people, and I had the opportunity to observe earlier in the Ethiopian situation. Behind the numbers there are people dying and there is an incredible tragedy unfolding there. I thank you for your efforts in trying to heighten sensitivity and awareness.

I don't have any questions other than just to note in connection with the very last observation you made with respect to Mr. Sadiq's statement about a call for peace that is also accompanied by his sending out emissaries to Libya and elsewhere seeking more arms. I guess there is still a real question as to what the agenda is—whether it is one of prosecuting the war or really seeking peace. That is where I hope that our Government and the rest of the international community will do their best to facilitate the beginning of a negotiated political settlement.

Mr. **Wolf**. I think you are exactly right. I might say for the record, when we were there we were with the SPLA and they have two MIGs that have crashed and they also have a Libyan pilot in captivity. When we were in Khartoum we saw Soviet MIGs on the runway and other Soviet aircraft that are operated by Libyan pilots.

I think your point is well taken. That is why a peace envoy sitting down and forcing the issue would be helpful. To go to the Libyans asking for more aid at the very time you are trying to get peace, is not the way to get peace.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you.

Mr. Leland.

Chairman **Leland**. I have no questions. I just want to thank you, Frank, for the work you have done not only here with this issue but with hunger in general—particularly as you brought back some information for the Congress on Ethiopia. I hope that you will continue that work because it is invaluable and your testimony was very illuminating.

Mr. **Wolf**. Thank you, Mickey.

Mr. **Ackerman**. I don't have a question either—just an additional comment if I may.

I want to thank you for your work in this area. I think you have been absolutely terrific.

Sometimes our constituents misunderstand the things that we do and they have their pet phrases for it. I'll just recall to you that we met at an airport—I was on my way to Belfast and you were on your way back home from the Sudan. While we waited out our respective delays, you were sharing with me some of the things that you had found. I think we became brothers. I recognized in you a broken man, having gone through the same experience when I was in Ethiopia—how demoralizing it is. When you come back here and set foot back on American soil something happens to rejuvenate you and to spring you into some kind of action to say that we are not really doing enough and we have to really be concerned about these people who are so different than we are and yet who are our brothers. I want to commend you for your work in this area and thank you.

Mr. **Wolf**. Thank you, Gary.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Mr. Hall.

Mr. **Hall**. Mr. Wolpe, Mr. Wolf, I just want to lend my voice to the gentleman who preceded me and thank you for the report that you have given us. Frank doesn't serve on any of the committees that really have jurisdiction. He's not on the Hunger Committee or the Foreign Affairs Committee but he is the kind of person that when he sees a problem, he doesn't ask anybody's permission, he just goes and sees it and comes back and diligently fights for what he thinks is needed. I think that a big reason why the administration is changing on this is because of your trip, your diligence, your persistence in trying to move them. I thank you for it, Frank.

Mr. **Wolf**. Thank you, Tony.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Mr. Crockett.

Mr. **Crockett**. No questions.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Mr. Fazio.

Mr. Dymally.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. **Smith**. No questions.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you very much, Frank, for your testimony.

At this point, I would like to ask my cochairman, Mr. Leland, if he would introduce the private witnesses for this morning's hearing.

Chairman **Leland**. We will now hear from two well-informed observers in the Sudan situation. If the first panel will come forward.

Roger Winter is the executive director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Mr. Winter is well known to the Hunger Committee and the Africa Subcommittee and to everyone who works on these issues. He is a tireless warrior for the displaced and the overlooked. Mr. Winter is probably more responsible than any individual for the recent attention the long overlooked Sudan emergency has received in this country. He has traveled to the southern regions of the Sudan on several occasions and brought back graphic and compelling accounts of the suffering. His efforts led to Chairman Wolpe and I sending a congressional staff delegation to the region last October. Roger Winter has returned only a few days ago from his latest trip to the Sudan.

Holly Burkhalter is the associate director of Human Rights Watch, an organization that monitors the protection or the abuse of basic human liberties around the world. Human Rights Watch has recently established an Africa Watch affiliate to look at particular concerns in Africa. Ms. Burkhalter has some observations to share on the current human rights situation in the Sudan.

Mr. Winter, if you could proceed first with your verbal statement, we will then hear from Ms. Burkhalter. We will then address questions to both of you. Your full statements, without objection, will be included in the record.

STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. **Winter**. I would like to thank the chairmen and the members of the committee for the work that you all have done on the Sudan already. If I may, I would like to express my personal admiration to Jeff Clark, Steve Morrison, and Ann Schonfield. They have done a very professional and, frankly, humanitarian job at making these issues better understood and more visible.

The tragedy in Sudan, has been a humanitarian emergency struggling for recognition and for adequate response. In actual fact, we knew pretty much a year ago what we now know about the humanitarian situation in the Sudan. For some reason here we are racing the clock, counting down the days until the rainy season begins. Unfortunately, where the refugees and displaced people are on the ground, little has as yet changed.

I would like to suggest that you take a look at the map which is attached to the back of my testimony. What I have done is mark in yellow those towns which, over the last year and in many cases in the last few months, have been taken by the SPLA. There are quite a number of them. It is important to understand that most of the white space in between those yellow marked towns is also under the control of the SPLA. The territory the SPLA controls is perhaps the size of Uganda. It's very large and it's growing.

Within the Sudan there are obviously a very significant number of people at risk. What I would like to do is divide them into four different groups.

The first are those that are civilians within the zone held by the SPLA. The area is somewhat sparsely populated but there are major concentrations of people there. Kapoeta is the best known. Around Kapoeta there are 22 feeding sites, some that go well down the road toward Torit, as well as other directions. There are over 100,000 people there. There are a number of other concentrations of civilians too. These are civilians that can only be reached by cross-border operations. They cannot be reached from Khartoum.

Cross-border operations at the current time only really exist into the SPLA area from Kenya. We need to be expanding that cross-border operation. We need to be implementing cross-border operations from Uganda and from Ethiopia to reach the widest possible group of civilians necessary. Frankly, we need to do it now. The cross-border operation that currently exists from Kenya has been going on for a substantial period of time. It has been meeting a very real need. I saw the way people looked last June and July when I was there. I saw the way they looked a couple of weeks ago. The steady, reliable supply of food has made a tremendous difference in rehabilitating people whose bodies were just entirely broken. Adults that were just this big around. It has made a tremendous difference. We haven't expanded these operations adequately to date. We need to expand them now.

The second group of civilians at risk are those that are in government-controlled garrison towns in the south. The picture of government-controlled garrison towns has been changing rather rapidly, even within the last week. I testified a week ago and talked a good bit about Torit. Torit has fallen to the SPLA. Even last night a small government garrison at a town along the Uganda border called Parajak fell to the SPLA. These are towns in which the primary occupants tend to be government soldiers. Civilians have tended to bleed out—quite literally bleed out—over time to other locations. Perhaps the best known garrison town is the capital of the south called Juba.

By many estimates there are 250,000 civilians in and around Juba. Juba is currently being supplied only by air flights supported by international sources including the United States—and being provided by voluntary agencies and the World Food Program. With the SPLA taking Torit last week and these other garrisons on the east bank of the Nile, the government no longer has soldiers in the very deep south. This means the SPLA is able to move up and concentrate their activity around Juba.

Make no mistake here, the SPLA is not a bunch of bush bandits. They have very substantial hardware. They have tanks. They have artillery. They have rocket launchers. In many cases, this is captured Sudanese Government hardware. Last week, for the first time, they dropped a few shells into Juba to make clear that they have the capability to do that. They have the capability and in the past have shut off air supply to Juba. I believe that, unless there is a major breakthrough on the peace front, what we can anticipate is a further tightening of the ring around Juba including further shelling. The SPLA is already broadcasting on its radio that civilians should attempt to leave Juba. It is going to be one very horrible, messy situation for the civilians involved. There are mines all over the place. It is going to be very difficult. We need to pray for a breakthrough on the peace front.

In case civilians do begin to leave Juba in substantial numbers, the very best operation currently in place to serve civilians between Kapoeta and Juba is the cross-border operation out of Kenya by the Norwegian People's Aid and the U.S. agency World Vision. We need to look at expanding that operation very quickly to meet that potentially large and very vulnerable need.

The next group of civilians are those who are in what we call the transitional zone between the north and the south. Much of that territory is controlled by the government but it is a very insecure area. It is an area which is heavily populated. It is an area of which I know comparatively less than I do about the civilians in the SPLA-held zone.

What I would like to point out to you is there are certain characteristics about the transitional zone which make it special. It is in this area that the government has armed militias who have long-term ethnic problems with the Dinka people and others. In arming those militias, the government has set loose a force which has wrecked havoc on civilians in that area and displaced people seeking to move through that area. The Government of Sudan may in fact have let the genie out of the bottle when they did this. By arming these undisciplined crowds with very deep ethnic hatreds, they may have made a cease-fire—they may have made a peace accord in practical terms—in that immediate area very difficult. I should point out that it is in this area that the efforts of the U.S. Government, A.I.D., and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance have been most visible.

The fourth group of civilians greatly at risk in the Sudan are the well over 1½ million, perhaps even more, displaced southern civilians who are located in and around Khartoum.

Mr. Chairman, there is no security problem in Khartoum. There are no roads being washed out by rain. There are no great difficulties of a logistical nature that inhibit the supplying of food and relief to these people. They didn't just arrive. In most cases they have been there for a year or more, occupying the least habitable parts of the city and the surrounding area. Why haven't they been assisted? In many ways the lack of obstacles to me means that the actions the government takes or fails to take to meet the needs of these vulnerable people, in many cases living on a garbage dump, are met are the bell weather, the prime indicator, for how the Government of Sudan chooses to deal with all displaced southerners.

When it comes to the American response to this tragedy, I must confess that sometimes over the last year or so I felt it to be somewhat Byzantine. I haven't always understood it. I want to be clear, however, what I mean. A lot of statements have been made about being evenhanded in the way relief is approached in the Sudan. I must be very clear that I believe that there are many people in the State Department, many people in A.I.D., and elsewhere within the administration, who have tried very hard. The food people at A.I.D., the people at the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance—they have tried I believe very hard in very difficult circumstances. But somehow, there has seemed to be a disconnect between the intentions of those people and those units, and the way American policy finally unfolded when it came to dealing with the Sudan.

This is not a conventional geopolitical issue. The alliances between the two contending parties are sometimes very difficult to really comprehend. Although it is over simplifying the case, it is of course a fact that the United States has been rather consistently supportive of the government. At the same time the primary supporters of the government in the military sense have been Libya and Iraq. It is too easy to say the SPLA is a problem for us and our Government politically. Yes, it is true that Ethiopia provides the base from which the SPLA operates. However, the SPLA supporters go far beyond simply Ethiopia. Kenya is a supporter in some practical ways of the SPLA. Kenya is perhaps the United States' major east African strategic partner. In fact much—some would say most—of sub-Saharan Africa is in their hearts and minds with the SPLA in this struggle. I am not a partisan of the SPLA. What I am suggesting though is that we cannot let flighty, geopolitical prejudices we have interfere with the evenhanded and adequate distribution and delivery of relief to needy civilians on both sides. As the Secretary of State said several weeks ago, this thing is too big—it is too bad—for us to get bogged down in those kinds of considerations.

It is very clear that the government in Khartoum is very unstable. We don't know whether or not there will be a change, perhaps even within a matter of hours. The most important thing for us to do is to be an evenhanded broker—an energetic broker—of peace within Sudan and to get on with the delivery of relief supplies in every way we can; not holding out for perfect solutions but pursuing practical solutions wherever they exist to meet the needs of the people who are the victims. If for some reason the Government of Sudan cannot understand our motivations, then we should be prepared to back away from it quite directly.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Winter appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 62.]

Chairman **Leland**. Thank you very much, Mr. Winter.

Ms. Burkhalter.

STATEMENT OF HOLLY BURKHALTER, WASHINGTON REPRESENTATIVE, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

Ms. **Burkhalter**. Thank you Chairman Leland and thank you for inviting Human Rights Watch to present testimony before the Select Committee on Hunger and the Africa Subcommittee. I have a lengthy statement and I would be grateful if you could include it in the record.

I wanted to pass on the sincere thanks of my organization to the members of the Select Committee on Hunger, the Africa Subcommittee and their excellent staff for your commitment to not only world hunger but also to monitoring human rights around the world.

I would just say at the outset that I don't need to remind the committee and expand on my colleague's excellent remarks about Sudan being a human rights disaster. I would just say that the enormous flow of people from their homeland—either displaced within their own country or outside their country's borders—is not an accident. It isn't some sort of mystery about why people flee their homes. They do not flee their homes casually or idly. People do not leave their communities and their belongings to flee into refuge for little reason whether it is in Afghanistan, which saw the flight of literally millions of its people, or Sudan, or Somalia, or El Salvador. All over the world people flee because they have a reason to. The reasons why they fled in Sudan have been apparent for many years.

I would just say that, while it is unattractive to engage in recriminations and I don't intend to, it is worth observing that the causes of the tragedy of 1988 and 1989, which resulted in the death of maybe half a million Sudanese, were quite visible to a number of you certainly. I was looking in the files of the Select Committee on Hunger the other day and noticed a statement from the select committee in 1986 which called upon the United States to press for a negotiated end to the conflict and called for cross-border feeding operations. I would also note Congressman Wolf's remark in his report that skeletal refugees were crossing into Ethiopia as early as November of 1987. The press might not have been on top of the story early on but you people were. I think the administration knew as well many years ago that some of the human rights practices of our ally in Khartoum were creating an enormous, enormous flow of people from their homes. The death of hundreds of thousands of them then might have been expected.

At the outset, in answer to Mr. Ackerman's question about what are the lessons we have learned—I think that the lesson at the top should be that there must be some sort of consensus when the early warning signs come out. It's too late for Sudan. It's too late for the half a million dead in Sudan, but look at Somalia which is in the same region. What happened last year when half a million Somalis fled their homes for some of the same reasons—for gross abuses of human rights in their homelands?

I would just turn then to some of the practices in Sudan which have resulted in one of the greatest human rights tragedies of the decade. My colleague has alluded to the practices of the militias—something that I know that both committees are familiar with. I would like to highlight these. Militias have existed in Sudan for many, many years and the tribal rivalries and problems between them—the Arab nomadic tribes, the Fertit, the Rizeigat, and some of the others that have been named in some of the horrible massacres of recent years. There have been conflicts between them and the Dinka and other African Christian tribes from the south.

What is different about the last couple of years is that from about 1985 or 1986 on, the government has been arming vast numbers of the militias with sophisticated weaponry that they did not possess before. In the past there may have been tribal rivalries, particularly in the border area that Roger was alluding to between the north and the south where traditionally the tribes were moving their cattle and their people from region to region. This was a region of rivalry in the past but today you have heavily armed militias which are really taking it out on the Dinkas and others. You find for example that it was possible for fully a thousand Dinka to be massacred at a single moment in the town of El Dien in 1987.

You also find that practices of slavery, which had occurred in the past and had not been unknown certainly in traditional tribal society, now have the added feature of being carried out with heavily armed militias and right under the nose of uniformed army personnel. I could say more about the practice of slavery if the committee is interested, but it's an enormous problem and a great, great tragedy. There is much known on it.

I would note that one of the features which interests me the most and which I would encourage the committee to question the executive branch witnesses about, is the degree of cooperation between the uniformed members of the Sudanese military and the armed militias which have been wrecking such havoc in the south and in the border areas between the north and the south.

I don't have a great deal of information on that but in recent conversations with Africa Watch's Sudan expert, I asked specifically about this problem. It is certainly the case that in many areas of the country there is explicit cooperation—indeed, the army is said to have actually armed the militias to fight the war against the SPLA for them. The army in many areas remains in the barracks and the militias have a free rein. Khartoum can then shrug it's shoulders and disavow any responsibility for the great abuses which have occurred thereafter. This is a key question for the subcommittee to look at. In your dealings with future aid to Sudan—clearly an important condition if the administration sees fit to resume military aid, which we strongly, strongly oppose—certainly an important condition must be the disarming of the militias. The army must be made completely responsible for protecting civilians in the areas where it has cynically armed their ethnic rivals.

I would go on to say that there are other human rights problems which my statement talks about in full.

I would say just a word about violations of the laws of armed conflict. When many civilians die in armed conflict, I think it is the tendency of some to fling up their hands and say: well, war is hell—civilians die when armies rage. It is worth our remembering that there are laws of armed conflict and some apply to noninternational armed conflict as is the case in Sudan. Common Article 3 and Protocol 2 of the Geneva Conventions are quite explicit on what kinds of practices are not allowed by either guerrillas of insurgent forces or by the government's armed forces. Those standards apply to Sudan. The armed forces have been cynically disregarding the lives of civilians in promulgating the war on the south.

My statement includes a quotation from one of the Catholic bishops from the south who talked about how Prime Minister Sadiq threatened to exterminate the south if John Garang continues to prosecute the war. An extermination it has indeed been—aerial bombardment, extensive killings, and then of course the deprivation of food to vast numbers of people has resulted in the large numbers of dead. I won't speak further about the use of food as a weapon because it has been detailed by my copanelists. My statement is extensive on that point.

I would say just a word about rebel violations of human rights which certainly have been reported. It is with great concern that we have heard that with the increased military operations Mr. Winter was describing in the south, the rebels have called upon all civilians to leave Juba. There are many displaced civilians in that region. With the siege of Juba already beginning, we are terribly concerned about the plight of civilians—not just for food, as Roger was describing, but at risk from shelling, bombardment, and other possible abuses as the SPLA attempts to take those southern garrison towns.

I think I will stop there to leave the committee time for questions, although I am eager to say more.

Thank you very much for having me.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Burkhalter appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 70.]

Chairman LELAND. Thank you both for your excellent testimonies.

Let me turn now to Mr. Winter and ask along with my cochair, if you can stay after we have asked these questions of you, to get your reflections of the statements that will be made by the administration.

Mr. Winter, could you specifically address the question of whether it would be advisable from your perspective for the U.S. Government to provide disaster assistance funding to the Norwegian People's Aid organization. That is funds for NPA to move food or medicine up to SPLA-controlled areas of the Sudan. Should we do this?

Mr. WINTER. My belief is we should. Because of the changing military situation, we have just received a specific new proposal, which I will happily share with you. It is an initial request by them for an expansion of their current operation which they conduct with World Vision.

Let me be clear why I think it is important. The Norwegian People's Aid operation functions almost like—forgive me for Americanisms—a humanitarian SWAT team. They have gone in and they are operating in a war zone. They have established good relationships with the commanders on the ground there. This has meant that they have had perhaps a greater degree of access than other nongovernmental organizations have had thus far. They have run an operation that works. It is an operation, which like an accordion at this point in time, can expand to meet the needs from Kapoeta all the way over to the river, if those needs exist. It is a successful operation. I have seen the difference it makes. Yes, I believe that we should be trying to expand that specific operation and achieving other operations like it at other border points.

Chairman **Leland**. I understand that there has been some confusion as to whether or not NPA would accept U.S. Government funds. What is your understanding on that?

Mr. **Winter**. Perhaps I should actually offer this for the record. We got this by fax yesterday from Nairobi from the Norwegian People's Aid. They are very clear that they believe the changing situation is something they can respond to. They need an infusion of funds to do that and to prepare for what may be the movement of civilians out of Juba.

Chairman **Leland**. Without objection the fax letter will be entered into the record.

[The letter referred to above appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Winter, is NPA the best bet for getting the relief moving into the parts of southern Sudan?

Mr. **Winter**. They are the only game in town right now. There are other NGO's that are attempting to establish programs in Pibor, in Boma, in Pochalla, and other locations, but this is the only substantive operation. It's the only one that actually is working and has a track record.

Chairman **Leland**. What is the operational capacity of the relief arm of the SPLA?

Mr. **Winter**. The SPLA has a humanitarian relief arm which is called the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency—the SRRA. In many senses of the word, it's embryonic. It is possible that it will be certified as a legitimate nongovernmental organization by the Government of Ethiopia. It seems that the SRRA has a greater capacity in those parts of the Sudan that are not really currently active war zones. In the active war zone that I am speaking of between Kapoeta and Juba, the SRRA doesn't really have much of a capacity at this time. This is why I am recommending that we support the existing Norwegian-World Vision cross-border operation.

Chairman **Leland**. Thank you.

Ms. Burkhalter, what is the direction of human rights protection in the Sudan?

Ms. **Burkhalter**. What is the direction? What can we see down the road?

Chairman **Leland**. I have the impression of a country where the government, the economy, and many institutions are in decline. Is respect for human rights in the Sudan in decline as well?

Ms. **Burkhalter**. Well, obviously the enormous tragedies in the south, which are a result of the government's prosecution of the war, are so awful that they tend to overshadow other aspects of the human rights situation.

As you know, Sudan has a free press and it has a parliament with political opposition from across the spectrum. There are certainly democratic institutions. It was an elected government although the south did not participate in the election. Many people have said that Sudan was one of the most democratic of the nations of the Arab and African worlds.

Having said that and noting that, it is also the case, Mr. Leland, that with the political crisis that the government has faced in the last 6 months, some of those institutions, which have existed and which we welcome, have come under siege a little bit. For example, there is a state of emergency which allows the government to hold political prisoners without charge. We had been impressed with the fact that the government of Prime Minister Sadiq had abolished previous laws on the books which had allowed for the holding of prisoners. Now, with the state of emergency, they can do the same.

I would also make note that there have been some ripples with respect to the press in Sudan as well. The foreign press got quite a trashing from the authorities last summer in their attempts to report on the way Khartoum was distributing assistance in the wake of the great floods. There were some rather unattractive things said about the governments withholding of supplies from the south and when the press spoke up about it, the government really responded publicly in a very strident manner and threatened to kick the journalists out, license them, et cetera. They have pulled back from that and we welcome that. There have been some signs like this that indicate that the democratic institutions which albeit—have no relevance whatsoever in the south, even in Khartoum have come under siege.

Chairman **Leland**. Given what human rights organizations have observed about the situation in Sudan, have you found credible the suggestions that some Sudanese Government officials would deny food to hungry southerners because of their religion or ethnic origin or political affiliation? Could that happen?

Ms. **Burkhalter**. It is certainly clear that it is happening. The problem is enormous and very well documented. I would say that the government's indifference to the killings, murder, theft and slavery of the tribes in the south by the militias that it armed, was an early warning signal that it had not the slightest concern about the welfare of its southern citizens. Thus, as horrible as it is, today's extraordinary famine with the withholding of food from the entire region or the attempts to withhold food, is certainly not a shock or a surprise to me.

Chairman **Leland**. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have other questions but I know that my time is far spent. Let me, if I can, turn to the vice chairman of the House Select Committee on Hunger, Mr. Emerson, the gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. **Emerson**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for my tardiness in arriving here this morning. I was attending the joint meeting in Congress which celebrated the bicentennial of the first meeting of Congress, which did not have a quorum. We didn't have a quorum over there today either. I apologize. I have an opening statement that I would like to ask unanimous consent to submit for the record.

Chairman **Leland**. Without objection.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Emerson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 48.]

Mr. **Emerson**. Do you agree or disagree with Secretary Baker's assessment that the starvation won't end until the fighting ends?

Mr. **Winter**. I absolutely agree.

Mr. **Emerson**. Should the first priority of the U.S. policy be to end the war or to get food to southern Sudan?

Mr. **Winter**. They are not mutually exclusive, sir. There is no question that to meet the overall needs of displaced and hungry people, you are going to have to have peace. There are just too many obstacles, logistical and security-wise, for that not to be the case.

On the other hand, there are some quite clear things that can be done now. While they may not meet 100 percent of the need, they will save people's lives now if they are done and, of course, I advocate that they should be. They include, for example, the kind of expansion of the cross-border operations that I was speaking of a little earlier.

Mr. **Emerson**. Toward the end of your prepared testimony, you said that the United States should seriously reconsider its relationship with the Sudanese Government. You then said that the United States should be an honest peace broker to end the war. Do you see any contradiction between those statements? Would the U.S. influence with Khartoum be increased or decreased by a rupture in relations and what effect would this have on our efforts to end the war and the famine?

Mr. **Winter**. What I was trying to get at is, notwithstanding the fact that we have talked about being evenhanded in the way we approach the need for peace and the humanitarian issues, there seems to have been somewhat of a disconnect. What I mean by that is: there seems to be a feeling within many of our policy makers—I don't know if it is written or oral—who have approached this issue as if it were a geopolitical issue—that because the SPLA has a base of operation in Ethiopia, that somehow it—the SPLA—is our enemy. I have felt very clearly that this has inhibited the way we have approached both the peace and the humanitarian issues. What I am suggesting is that we get by that feeling which I think is present and recognize that both parties here have inhibited the adequate relief supplies to individuals.

If you will look at the situation, the greatest number of civilians at risk are within government-controlled areas. I'm talking in part—not only, but in part—about that 1½ million people in the Sudan capital of Khartoum who could be reached rather directly. I hope that we don't get to the place where we have to talk about rupturing relations. I think the practical aspect is that the government in Khartoum is so unstable, we may see within a matter of hours or days a change that will hopefully lead us down the peace road better.

What I am suggesting is if the government somehow can't tolerate an evenhanded, comprehensive relief effort to meet the needs of their own citizens, then we really should consider backing away from them. They don't really merit our respect and our relationship in the same way, if that is the position they take.

Mr. **Emerson**. Aside from famine relief, how does our foreign aid to Sudan compare to aid from other countries?

Mr. **Winter**. I confess I can't really speak to that. I am most familiar with the humanitarian relief. There is no question in my mind that on a dollar basis the United States has done more in the area of relief and has attempted to do more than other countries.

However, if you start to look at it on a per capita basis, you have to keep in mind we are a pretty big place and countries like Holland and Norway are pretty small. I think possibly on a per capita basis, some of those countries may have actually infused more resources than we have.

Mr. **Emerson**. What implications would you draw from that regarding the relative influence of the United States with the government in Khartoum? Who really has influence there?

Mr. **Winter**. What I would like to suggest is that we do have influence. We appear not to have used every ounce of influence that is at our command, such as through multilateral lending institutions and other kinds of techniques like that. I'm not suggesting the United States can do this alone. What I would like to see is us out front, leading a broad-based, international diplomatic initiative to bring about peace in that country. If we get together with other countries, I think we can have the leverage.

Mr. **Emerson**. Thank you.

Ms. Burkhalter, the previous Government of Sudan was widely criticized for being corrupt, oppressive, inefficient, antidemocratic, et cetera. The overthrow of that government was widely applauded by the human rights community. Would you say that the human rights situation in Sudan has improved or worsened since the overthrow of that government in 1985?

Ms. **Burkhalter**. As I mentioned before, certainly when the new government was formed there were some welcome developments which the human rights community applauded, such as repeal of some of the most repressive laws which had characterized the Nimeiri regime. Without meaning to diminish that significance, I would say the policies that have been in place for the last couple of years—which indeed had their antecedents in the Nimeiri regime—the militias didn't start under Sadiq. The extraordinarily cynical deprivation of food from the south, which has resulted in half a million deaths, so overwhelms anything positive I can find to say about some significant civil rights or political rights or improvements since 1985. You can see why I am floundering in answering your question, sir.

Mr. **Emerson**. It is a very complex situation. I realize there are no simple answers there. I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Chairman.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask Mr. Winter if he might provide his assessment of the aggregate need for emergency assistance in the south as well as the north at this point?

Mr. **Winter**. I cannot give you an aggregate figure. What I can tell you is that, in what I consider to be a very positive initiative, the State Department/A.I.D. fielded an assessment team of mixed government and nongovernmental organizational experts in humanitarian relief. They travelled to the north and the south very recently and have provided a report which I have not seen. This report should be in the best position to give that aggregate number. I'm sorry I don't have that.

Mr. **Wolpe**. OK. Thank you. Let me thank you both for excellent testimony.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. **Ackerman**. Thank you both.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Mr. Payne.

Mr. **Payne**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't have any specific question. I'm sorry too to be late. I did appreciate the testimony that I heard. I am certainly aware of the fact that there are extreme problems in the Sudan and certainly a need for tremendous aid and support. I am here basically trying to listen and ascertain what the real situation is so we can move forward.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman **Leland**. I appreciate the gentleman's comments.

We are pleased to have with us today Mr. Kenneth Brown, deputy assistant Secretary of State for Africa; Ms. Julia Taft, who has appeared before us several times before and who is director of the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance; and Mr. Larry Saiers, deputy assistant administrator for Africa, Agency for International Development or A.I.D. All three of the witnesses are experts on the Sudan crisis and will speak to us about the emergency and U.S. policies in regard to that emergency.

We will hear first from Julia Taft.

Ms. **Taft**. Thank you very much sir. I'm very pleased to be here today.

Chairman **Leland**. Just a moment please, Ms. Taft. What we would like to do is ask that each of you would speak for a period of 5 minutes. You can submit your whole statements as you have prior to the hearing for the purpose of the record.

Ms. **Taft**. Would you like me to go first or Mr. Brown?

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Brown, you certainly may proceed first if you would like.

STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. **Brown**. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss the civil war and famine in Sudan. I am submitting written testimony for the record but would like briefly to reiterate U.S. Government's views as set forth most recently February 8 at the time of Secretary Baker's statement on Sudan.

At that time Secretary Baker expressed our Government's profound concern about massive suffering in Sudan and called on both sides in the war to do everything possible to provide relief to victims of the war and place peace first.

The United States believes that no issue is as urgent as relief for the victims of the conflict. But we recognize that peace is the real answer to the suffering in Sudan. Hence, our central objective is to end the war.

The United States has long ties of friendship with Sudan, supports its democratic institutions, and recognizes the importance of its stability for the region. Our policy thus is centered on support for Sudan's democracy, a peaceful solution to the war, and relief for its victims.

Even without a war, any relief effort would be severely complicated by the vastness of the territory, lack of infrastructure, inhospitable terrain, the presence of bandits, and the lack of reliable information on population concentrations and need. The war has been the dominant factor. Unfortunately, both sides have tended to place political and military considerations above the humanitarian.

Recently, increased cooperation by both sides has allowed progress on relief. For many months the United States has been in the forefront of efforts to provide it. The United States has not failed to push either side. It has not sat idly or silently by. This is true of both the previous administration and the current administration. Obviously, much remains to be done. My colleague, Ms. Taft, will provide further information on our relief activities.

The United States has also taken an active role in promoting a negotiated settlement. Intensive efforts throughout 1988, including those by the United States, unfortunately did not succeed in bringing Prime Minister Sadiq and SPLA leader Garang together. But many contacts at other levels between the sides helped prepare the way for productive talks which took place in Addis Ababa in November between Sudan's Democratic Unionist Party—DUP—and SPLA representatives. The DUP/SPLA proposal contained the key elements of compromise which would halt the fighting and permit both sides to join in a constitutional convention for discussion of the issues separating them and leading to a new constitution for Sudan.

Ethiopian support and sanctuary have been essential for the SPLA. The United States has taken the initiative in discussing Ethiopia's policies and role with the Soviets. We will continue to seek an end to external interference in Sudan as well as progress with the Soviets in pursuit of negotiated solutions to the region's problems.

The Horn of Africa is in a state of flux. We will take advantage of opportunities to have a positive influence on the course of events there. Regardless of the outcome of current developments in Khartoum, and we all know what those are, we will continue to do our best to promote peace and relief. But, Sudan's civil war involves fundamental internal issues and legitimate southern grievances which the Sudanese themselves must resolve. I would like to underline legitimate southern grievances in reply to the point made about our regarding the SPLA as the enemy.

Despite the promise of the DUP/SPLA peace proposal, the government has not brought about agreement of the constituent assembly and cabinet, which could lead to implementation of the proposal. The United States supports all three fundamental elements of the peace proposal: a constitutional convention to bring the parties together, no preemptive moves to revise or implement Islamic laws pending convening of the conference, and a cease-fire demonstrating the good will of both sides to engage in productive talks.

Of these considerations a cease-fire, which is necessary for getting relief to all those in need, is most urgent. We should recognize, however, that achieving a cease-fire will be very difficult, particularly under the present circumstances in which the SPLA is making significant military gains.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 87.]

Chairman **Leland**. Thank you, Mr. Brown.

Ms. Taft.

STATEMENT OF JULIA VADALA TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, ACCOMPANIED BY LARRY SAIERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. **Taft**. Thank you very much. I am delighted to be here to talk about perhaps one of the grimmest situations in the world today from a humanitarian standpoint, and to try to convey to your committee our appreciation for the attention and support you have given particularly to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and to all of us who have been trying to deal with a very difficult situation compounded by the security problems in Sudan.

After your hearing last July, we and many of the other donors intensified our efforts to try to find out more facts about what was going on. We realized that it was only in the summer time that we really did start seeing and have access to people who were coming out from the south to the north as a result of the rains and the starvation. We had already been working with the ICRC and trying to get approval for the ICRC flights by both the SPLA and the Government of Sudan. We intensified those efforts of support. ICRC was in high negotiations on access. At that time, we believed it was very important to keep the principle of access by the ICRC very much in the forefront. It is the traditional organization that has the international mandate to work in areas of conflict.

However, after your hearing one of the people who also testified came up to me and said: you know, I don't think that the American PVO's know that you are willing to provide assistance to any one in need throughout Sudan. Perhaps you should discuss with them their interest in proposals and getting involved in feeding programs both in the north and the south. It was at that point that we did go out to a number of individual PVO's and solicited from them expressions of interest. We encouraged them to identify, however they could, opportunities for assistance throughout the country to people who were in need.

I also was in touch and had gone to Oslo to discuss among other things the issue of support by the U.S. A.I.D. for assistance through the Norwegian People's Association and for the activities that were going on in Kapoeta. We were told at the time: thank you very much but the police is we are not going to be needing U.S. Government assistance for this program.

The letter that Roger Winter is going to give you to introduce into the record, which he received from Egil Hagen yesterday—Roger did bring to me. We have reviewed it. It is a 1-page letter indicating an interest in $0.5 million for an expanded program. This is one of three expressions of interest for assistance we have had to date that we are working on, in addition to a number of activities that we are funding for Juba, Yei, Khartoum, and other places to feed the people of the south. This isn't really a proposal, it's just an expression of interest.

In a closed session, I will be glad to go into details. We are very receptive to assistance programs. What we want are conduits. Unfortunately Mr. Egil Hagen, although he is characterized as being the best conduit there is, is only one person. He is one person. We are very pleased that he is able to couple assistance with other NGO's which is now the approach that we are taking to try to enhance the out-reach capability.

There are many things that need to be done. There are very few conduits that are safe to do it through. Let me just give you one illustration. Several months ago we were requested to provide parachutes for an airlift into Torit. We did that. We flew the parachutes over there at some expense to get them prepositioned for the Norwegian church aid to be able to fly them into Torit. They could find no pilot that would be willing to go into the conflict area to deliver food with those parachutes. They still remain in Juba and we hope we will be able to use them, not necessarily for Torit but for some other source. We have had a very hard time finding pilots who can fly.

One of the problems of assessment in the south is that there is only one aircraft out of Nairobi that will be able to fly up to various places like Pibor, Torit, and some of the other locations. There is a war going on and we can say and try to do whatever we possibly can to provide assistance, but we have to have conduits. We have to have truckers who are willing to risk their lives to truck. We have got to find pilots. We have got to find approaches. Food is not the problem. Money is not the problem.

The U.S. Government since February of 1988, has spent $62 million, $43 million of which has been in emergency aid for the people of Sudan. I might also say a substantial amount of that has gone to the displaced persons in Khartoum. We are concerned about those in Khartoum. We are concerned about the lack of access to those people in Khartoum and we do agree that pressure must be maintained to insure that the displaced persons in Khartoum are well provided for. However, we are talking about over 2 million people throughout the whole region who are at risk. It is not a new problem.

My testimony, which I would like to submit for the record, summarizes in a chronicle form the activities that have been going on for the last several years. We are at a period now of intensified need to move because of the rainy season. If we do not get food in now, we believe that the tragic repetition of last year will happen.

Next week as you pointed out, sir, the U.N. and the Government of Sudan will be holding a conference in Khartoum. I plan to go to that conference. I hope it will come off. We have been working very closely with the other donors in planning our own plan of action and what our presentation will be. We have worked closely with the U.N. and in Khartoum there is close cooperation with the RRC and with other donors. We think the meeting cannot be window dressing. The issues are too great. The resolutions must happen very quickly to increase the flow of food.

In our plan of action we have a number of recommendations that we are pressing on now and will intensify next week, which are things the Government of Sudan can do right now to allow further flow of food. These are things such as allowing us to have dedicated barges. The barges that went to Malakal that arrived just recently were the first food the Malakal had received in a year. We want those barges turned around. It is within the government's authority to do that and to dedicate it to relief. We want the train—the train that just arrived in Aiwel. Again, this is the first food that has been received in months. We want that turned around fast. We don't want a 6-month turnaround. These are things that are possible for the Government of Sudan to do.

We have added another aircraft to our fleet that is there flying medicines around. We have put millions of dollars into medical programs for people who are not starving, they are dying of meningitis and other complications. This is both in the Government of Sudan side as well as in the SPLA- controlled areas. It is not just a food problem. It is a human problem with dimensions that include medicine, blankets, shelter, and water. We are looking at all these things in a very aggressive way. I think our record is very good and we appreciated your kind remarks earlier. We are pushing every way we can and taking a lead.

Out of Khartoum, however, we expect the plan of action to include a number of provisions which will require acquiescence from both sides—both the Government of Sudan, as well as the SPLA—such items as a period of truce. The U.N. right now is tentatively talking about a period of tranquility for a month—a month of tranquility. We feel that we have enough food prepositioned and enough aircraft prepositioned, although sometimes fuel is a problem. If we could just get the fighting to stop while they are working on peace, we can preposition enough food before May so that the feeding will be able to continue through November when the rains let up. This requires agreement on both sides.

Our concern about the conference in Sudan is that the level of donor participation will be basically from their official representation in Khartoum. To date I think I am the only principal relief representative from a donor capital that will be going. We feel we must go. Jim Grant, from UNICEF, and Jim Engram, from WFP, will also be attending for the U.N. The real question that we have is: what happens after you have the meeting in Sudan and you have a plan of action that requires acquiescence from the other side? We are trying to press for some specific initiatives that will be undertaken by the donors, by us, and by the U.N. to make sure that this is not a unilateral conference because the SPLA is not invited to the Khartoum conference. There are problems but we are working very hard to get some very specific agreements which can be achieved.

In closing, let me just make a couple of comments if I might, sir, on Armenia. As you know our office was also responsible for coordinating the U.S. Government response to Armenia.

Armenia did have the attention of the world. Sudan does not. It had so much attention that 90 countries provided assistance. In Sudan our estimate is about eight or nine donors are involved in the humanitarian response. The United States, as you know, is by far and large the major donor. About 90 percent of the assistance comes from the United States. In Armenia we had access wherever we needed to go. There was no active war going on. In Sudan we do not have that. The level of effort is quite different.

In Armenia my staff and I were there 3 weeks for the emergency assistance program. We have been working on problems in Sudan from a humanitarian standpoint since 1984. I have sent staff out there. I continue to send special task forces out there. I have people that go with PVO's out there. We have a whole A.I.D. mission dedicated to this. The level of effort is as different as night and day.

Finally, with regard to the amount of money, the U.S. Government spent $2 million on our response to Armenia. As I quoted earlier, we have in the past year already spent $62 million in Sudan.

I think that the question of international awareness and understanding of what is happening in Sudan is certainly contributed to by the efforts of this committee and by the media here. We hope there will be a lot of attention in Sudan on the problems during the conference next week. Maybe that will elevate and escalate the awareness that we all have a role to play in preventing a holocaust this year.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Taft appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 97.]

Chairman LELAND. Thank you very much, Ms. Taft.

Chairman Wolpe.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you very much. Thank you both for your testimony today.

I would like to zero in first of all on the diplomatic questions that are before us.

Since the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) has signed the peace agreement with the SPLA, that agreement appears widely popular within the Sudan. The Sudanese military in fact has given the Prime Minister until March 5th to accept that agreement or to resign. Our friends, the Egyptians, are clearly favorable, encouraging the government to move in that direction. Why do we not publicly push hard for the government to accept that accord and why not send a special envoy to the Sudan at this immediate moment to underline our support for the accord to be embraced by the Prime Minister and to accept essentially what the military has laid down?

Mr. BROWN. We have made our position clear, both publicly and privately, on this proposal. Referring back to the paper issued by the department on February 8 at the time of the statement by the Secretary, we made very clear our position on this proposal. I did it again here today. Right from the beginning we have made this clear in our conversations with the Sudanese Government with no equivocation whatsoever. I did this personally in December for example.

Mr. WOLPE. Aren't we right now in a very special moment in which the Prime Minister is faced with a decision? I would think that right now, of all moments, there should be someone over there expressing American support for that initiative in rather dramatic fashion.

Mr. BROWN. As I say, sir, we have made this very, very clear to the Sudanese Government. The Sudanese military are aware of our position. With regard to the suggestion of a special envoy, this is certainly a worthwhile suggestion that at some point may be the way to go.

Mr. WOLPE. I'm less clear than you are in what you say we have expressed to the government either publicly or via private channels. Secretary of State Baker's own statement talked about putting peace first in rather general terms and then called for an agreement to an early cease-fire. Yet, I think it is clear that you are not about to get a cease-fire in Sudan absent a broader agreement concerning the constitutional conference, the ending of the state of emergency, and a freeze on the implementation or revision of Sharia law, which are in fact the key elements of the accords that have been negotiated. Is it our position that the accords themselves should be embraced as a means of resolving this terrible political stalemate within the Sudan?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes, sir. I call your attention to the official document issued with the Secretary's statement on February 8 which makes exactly those points. I made the same points 5 minutes ago.

Mr. **Wolpe**. I hope that it would be possible again. I think that now is the time to weighin diplomaticly to reinforce that.

It has been widely reported that Sudan has received extensive military aid from Libya and some from Iraq. What exactly have they received from each country? What is the estimated value of that military support? What other economic aid has Sudan obtained from these countries and has Sudan also actively been seeking military or other aid from any other terrorist countries?

Mr. **Brown**. They certainly have received assistance from Libya. I believe they have also received some from Iraq. I don't have figures for the military assistance. We do know that in recent months there has been Libyan assistance to include tactical support in the south—the flying of planes, et cetera. That certainly has taken place. I do not have figures on the military assistance.

The Libyans have supplied military equipment to Sudan since Prime Minister Sadiq came to power in 1986. They have provided weapons, ammunition, and aircraft. Libyan pilots have mounted air support operations for the Sudanese military. With the current political crisis, Libyan military shipments appear to be increasing, although we can't confirm any dollar figure like the $250 million reported in the press.

Libya's most important form of assistance to Sudan has been oil, which has been provided to Sudan periodically. A long-term supply agreement exists but deliveries have not been dependable since Libya has periodically used oil deliveries as a means of political leverage.

Regarding Iraq: During the past several years Iraq has provided the Sudanese with weapons, ammunition, other equipment and military transport to support the Sudanese military in the civil war.

Further details on assistance from Libya and Iraq can be provided in classified form.

On your question about support from terrorist countries: We are unaware of any requests the Sudanese may have made in the past several years to other terrorist countries for military support.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Do we know how many Libyan MIGs there are operational now within the Sudan?

Mr. **Brown**. No, sir. There were two recently that were shot down or that crashed. They may have just run out of fuel but in any case they came down. I don't have a precise figure.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Would you supply that to the committee?

Mr. **Brown**. I will try to find that for you. There are still more that are flying.

Mr. Wolpe. Is it true that at the same time that the Prime Minister was talking about his desire for peace the other day, that roughly in the same time frame, he sent envoys to secure more arms from Libya and elsewhere? Are there any other terrorist nations that have been solicited for arms?

Mr. Brown. There was a delegation that went to Tripoli seeking support. One of the grievances that has been put forth by the military is that they do not feel that they had been adequately supplied and adequately supported in pursuit of the war.

Mr. Wolpe. Are there any other countries that have been solicited?

Mr. Brown. I don't know right off hand of other ones. I do know that they sent the delegation to Libya.

We are aware that Sudan has requested military assistance from a number of Arab States and countries outside the Middle East. These requests have not been publicized; both Sudan and the solicited countries consider such matters to be sensitive. I would be pleased to provide what we know on this subject in classified form. I can tell you here, however, that Libya and Iraq are Sudan's most important current sources of military assistance. Nearly all other countries the Sudanese have approached in the past several years have provided very little, if any, military assistance.

Mr. Wolpe. The American Government has tended to minimize, especially during the previous administration, the leverage that we had on Sudan by referring to declining aid levels. Is it not true that pipeline moneys from previous years have been flowing even as new aid has decreased?

Mr. Saiers. Pipeline money has continued to flow for projects that were put into place in prior years. The overall pipeline is no longer anywhere near what it was in the heyday of the Sudan program in the early 1980's. I don't have the exact figures. I think that as of today it is probably something on the order of about $85 million in project pipeline. The bulk of that is tied up in road projects which are trying to expand the road network into the west so that there is in fact better access to the west. There have been substantial amounts of assistance that have been deobligated from projects that were no longer able to be carried out. Some of those funds have been used to support the relief effort.

Mr. Wolpe. I have been advised that, although no military aid was obligated in fiscal years 1988 and 1989, we signed or contemplated signing agreements for $22.2 million and for $10 million in foreign military sales from old funds in those respective years.

Mr. Brown. I do not have the exact figure, sir.

You are correct that $22 million worth of foreign military sales cases were signed by Sudan in fiscal year 1988. Only $4.4 million in cases were signed in the first quarter of fiscal year 1989. It is unlikely that additional cases will be signed for the remainder of fiscal year 1989 because Sudan has been unable to make its Brooke payments and will have great difficulty clearing Brooke arrears by the end of the fiscal year. The $10 million figure for fiscal year 1989 was the best estimate available at the time the congressional presentation document was prepared. It was based on the assumption that Sudan would not have Brooke problems and would receive $5 million in MAP funding for fiscal year 1989.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Those are from the Defense Department. Those numbers are derived from the Defense Department congressional presentation document.

Mr. **Brown**. We do have a military assistance program in Sudan that as you have noted has not been funded for fiscal 1988 or fiscal 1989. There has been money which has carried over from previous years. We have emphasized transportation, logistics, and training. We have most recently—and it is quite possible that at least some of the money that you are referring to has been used to equip a reconnaissance force for Western Darfur. This would help the military in their efforts to try to protect that part of Sudan which is very large and rather empty from incursions by the Libyans.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Isn't it true that several million dollars in military aid funds will be freed up for the Sudan if Sudan pays its arrears on the debt it owes the United States?

Mr. **Brown**. There won't be that much freed up. In terms of unobligated funds or unearmarked funds for particular items, the DOD has tried to scrub the accounts. They think they have come up with about $3 million. That would be scrubbing the previous cases for which——

Mr. **Wolpe**. I find it rather extraordinary that we would contemplate the continued provision of delivery of some of these pipeline funds given the circumstances in the Sudan right now. I don't hear you suggesting for a moment that the State Department or our Government is contemplating the suspension of any and all shipments absent the kind of peace accord acceptance that has been negotiated.

Mr. **Brown**. We would not be providing equipment for use in the war in the south. I think I got a chuckle some place, but that's true. We are doing our best to monitor that. We do feel that——

Mr. **Wolpe**. Let me just interrupt here just to indicate that the DOD congressional presentation document does refer to armored personnel carriers that presumably would be used in the south as a piece of what would continue to be supplied to the Sudan.

Mr. **Brown**. We have provided for the recon force what they call Hummers, which are not armored personnel carriers. They are recon vehicles or utility vehicles such as a jeep might be.

Mr. **Wolpe**. I'm talking about V-150s.

Mr. **Brown**. V-150s—there were V-150s that were provided before. I know of no V-150s that would be in the pipeline now.

Mr. **Wolpe**. In the $5 million request for 1989, the Defense Department has a provision calling for funds to both provide and maintain these vehicles. We can get into that——

Mr. **Brown**. Let me just add, sir, that we do feel that it is important for us to maintain a good relationship with the Sudanese military because of the important role the Sudanese military plays in that society and because of the fact that it is a moderate professional military. As we can see right now it is playing a role in current events and one which we hope will be a positive one for whatever outcome there may be.

Mr. **Wolpe**. You mention in your statement that Ethiopia has played a spoiler role at times. Most recently has not the Ethiopian Government actively supported the peace negotiations between the DUP and the SPLA?

Mr. **Brown**. In a step which was not in accord with their previous approach, they did facilitate those talks which took place between the DUP and the SPLA.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Has it not shown increased sensitivity to the human needs of the Sudanese refugees inside its territory, as well as to those who are displaced—who are at risk across the border in SPLA territory?

Mr. **Brown**. It has been difficult for us to get access to the refugees who are in the south. Ethiopians are very restrictive in that regard. We do hope that the Ethiopian Government will be forthcoming in regard to any efforts to provide food into Sudan.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Both of the congressional staff delegations that have travelled to Ethiopia were permitted access to those camps that you say you have had difficulty getting access to.

Mr. **Brown**. I certainly don't dispute that. The Ethiopians are very uneven as to who they allow to go there and this is in terms of not only official personnel from the U.S. Embassy but people from the voluntary organizations.

Chairman **Leland**. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. **Wolpe**. Sure. I'd be pleased to.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Brown, have you actively pursued the Ethiopians to allow you to go into the south?

Mr. **Brown**. Yes. We asked this question. I am not perhaps the best one to answer this. Perhaps some of my colleagues know the answer. I raised this with John Garang in May when I was in Addis. I asked him if he could use his influence with the Ethiopians——

Chairman **Leland**. I'm sorry, who did you ask?

Mr. **Brown**. John Garang the head of the SPLA—if he could use his influence with the Ethiopian Government at that time to open up access to those camps because we were not getting it. He said that he didn't have the leverage to do it and we would have to look elsewhere. I cannot tell you what has been the case in the last few months.

Chairman **Leland**. Ms. Taft, your comments?

Ms. **Taft**. It's my understanding that there has been a member of the refugee bureau that has been able to have access to the Somali camps in Ethiopia. I do not believe any U.S. person has actually been able to go to the Sudanese camps.

I just got passed a note that the U.N. HCR High Commissioner Hocke will visit but could not arrange any other access. There are reasons why they do not like to have a lot of expatriots running around that area. It is mostly because of the security considerations. What the Government of Ethiopia has done is they have basically relied on their Red Cross and some U.N. people for assistance for the Sudanese refugees in the Ethiopian camps.

Chairman **Leland**. I would like to talk to both of you about this because my staff as well as Congressman Wolpe's staff persons have gone into that area.

Ms. **Taft**. That is why we're very pleased with your cooperation and information on this because we find you can go places and talk to people that we are unable to. This is not because we don't try, it's because they have a great deal of respect for the independence of the Congress of this United States. We do work closely, as you know, with your staff and with you. We need to find as much information as we can. The U.N. HCR is the primary focal point for the funding of assistance.

Hocke has reported that they will not give any more NGO presence in Gambela. Hocke spoke in Addis with the Ethiopians and it has just been reported that the Ethiopians would not agree to allow more NGO personnel to Gambela, the PVO personnel. That also includes us.

Chairman LELAND. I believe Congressman Wolpe and I can make an appeal that might be very helpful in this matter.

Ms. TAFT. I think that would be very useful.

We also have approached the Soviets on some issues relating to relief access and I would like to talk to you about those as well. We have a variety of options for supporting the refugees and displaced persons which I think is inappropriate to talk about now in the open.

We still have a great problem in the conduits of assistance.

Chairman LELAND. I understand.

I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. WOLPE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BROWN. I just wanted to reinforce that we would appreciate the assistance that Congressman Leland has indicated. As both you and Congress Ackerman know in regard to the impact you had in appealing for the release of Ethiopian Jews, often congressional input and access are better than our own.

Mr. WOLPE. We would be pleased to pursue that initiative with those that we do know in the government.

I have taken a good deal of time—let me just ask Ms. Taft two very quick questions for the record.

I am correct am I not in understanding that the current policy of the administration is to solicit and fund proposals aggressively from agencies for cross-border relief to SPLA territory?

Ms. TAFT. We will entertain and fund any viable proposal that will feed people in need in the south.

Mr. WOLPE. I am correct, am I not, in understanding that the current policy of the administration is to deliver relief to the south—aggressively, by whatever means works—to support the ICRC operation, and at the same time support the creation of other cross-border channels?

Ms. TAFT. We very strongly support the ICRC approach. We think it is very urgent that we maintain pressure on both sides to allow the expansion of the ICRC program. What we are seeing now, quite interestingly, is a lot more interest on the part of the SRRA and the SPLA to provide assistance to SPLA-controlled areas and at the same time they don't want to go ahead and allow assistance to the GOS areas. It's very difficult. We feel that we should continue the programs that we currently have. We should expand but we also at the centerpiece of this want to push both sides to go with the ICRC program. We've got to——

Mr. WOLPE. The ICRC program does involve cross-border operations, doesn't it?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, I understand that. It does involve some cross-border operations. There are ICRC flights that go from Lokachakio into the south. We have a number of flights that you know of that go into Juba and Yei. There are programs, not ICRC programs in some of the other——

Mr. WOLPE. We are pushing, are we not, for other cross-border opportunities beyond the ICRC? Or are we simply limiting ourselves to the ICRC?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, we are.

Mr. WOLPE. We are.

Ms. TAFT. We will not explain them in public.

Mr. WOLPE. Yes.

Thank you.

Chairman LELAND. The gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

War and political problems aside, what is the status of the infrastructure in Sudan? Assuming that the war issue is resolved and the political problems are resolved, what is the ability of the government in the best of circumstances to get relief to the people?

Mr. BROWN. Well, it's very poor, sir. As I noted in my opening statement, they have a vast terrain that they have to try to cover. Communications are very poor. The transport network is very poor.

Mr. EMERSON. Do they have roads?

Mr. BROWN. In some places they have roads and in other places they don't have roads.

Mr. EMERSON. Is it similar to what we saw in Ethiopia? Is it similar?

Mr. BROWN. It is probably worse, sir, down in the south.

Mr. EMERSON. They only have one port?

Mr. BROWN. Port Sudan is the major port of entry from the sea. Yes, sir.

Mr. EMERSON. Congressman Wolf in his statement said that he had recommended to the administration that the United States appoint an individual with a thorough understanding of Africa and its politics—a peace envoy of sorts—to negotiate between both sides of the Sudanese conflict in order to achieve a cease-fire and open roads policies that will allow food, medicine, and supplies to reach all parts of the Sudan. Do you know how that recommendation is being accepted at the State Department?

Mr. BROWN. It certainly is positively regarded, sir. But I would like to note that we have been in touch with both sides for a good many months.

Mr. EMERSON. I understand. That hasn't worked. I think Congressman Wolf was suggesting some extraordinary procedure—that we make a new declaration of intent vis-a-vis Sudan and send someone with some stature over there to try to negotiate this thing. Is it possible that that might be considered?

Mr. BROWN. It certainly would be considered. I don't think that the present time is the time to do it.

Mr. EMERSON. What better time?

Mr. BROWN. For one thing, sir, we would like to see how things sort themselves out in the current situation in Khartoum.

Mr. EMERSON. How much time are you willing to give that undertaking to see how things sort out?

Mr. BROWN. We are keeping a very close eye on it to see how it does evolve. We haven't set any sort of a deadline but we are watching that extremely closely. We have an Embassy out there that is extremely close to the question and watching it very, very closely.

Mr. Emerson. How closely are we working with the Soviets?

Another point Congressman Wolf made was that he had recommended that we ask the Soviets to urge the SPLA to reach a cease-fire agreement with the Government of Sudan. Is this being undertaken aggressively?

Mr. Brown. We are in repeated contact with the Soviets. The most recent contact as Ms. Taft has noted was in regard to the relief side and the use of Soviet influence through the Ethiopians on the SPLA to help with the relief. I think we need to recognize that right now the SPLA is not eager for a cease-fire. One can understand that given its military position. We are hoping that things sort themselves out in Khartoum and there will be renewed emphasis on that on both sides. At present we don't think it's going to come about real quickly. We are in touch with the Soviets.

We are in touch with the Soviets on a broader sense too in regard to the Horn as a whole and ways in which they may use their influence particularly with the Ethiopians——

Mr. Emerson. What level of cooperation would you say we're getting with the Soviets?

Mr. Brown. So far the discussion about the Horn in general and the peace issues has been general. We haven't got down to an operational level which we intend to do.

Mr. Emerson. Why?

Mr. Brown. Because they have not been willing to go to that level. They have indicated that they will and this is something that I think in the near future we will be discussing with them.

Mr. Emerson. What I am going to say I don't mean in any discouraging way. Sometimes I worry that State Department people talk to State Department people. You talk here with the Embassy in Addis, Khartoum, or wherever, and you are dealing with people who are established there. I am sure they are good lines of communication. I have heard a lot of responses here today that would indicate that we are talking this and we're talking that and they tell us they can't do this and they tell us they can't do that. Very often that is reality.

I'm wondering here if it might not be possible to rise above that syndrome for something dramatic to happen—for Secretary Baker to take matters in hand—for him, for example, to talk to the Soviet foreign minister and say: look, here's a situation in Sudan where we can probably both bring some considerable influence to bear, why don't we do it. There are a couple of million people starving to death there. I'm not happy to leave this at the level of the State Department sending messages back and forth to Embassies over there only to be told we've tried but we can't get through. As I say, I'm not saying that critically but we hear that so very often. I just have to believe that if this matter were being dealt with at the highest policy levels, something would give here. Certainly, it doesn't seem to me that there is any element in Sudan that is able entirely to force its will upon the people at large and there is a circumstance existing there in which some outside pressure could be enormously helpful.

Please comment.

Mr. **Brown**. I can assure you, sir, that we do a lot more than have State Department people talk with State Department people. We have, in Sudan itself and with regard to the Sudan conflict, been in touch with both sides on a wide range of issues primarily on these basic issues of peace and relief. I think we have had an effect. I think the ICRC program, which is feeding people on both sides of the lines, came about to a large extent because of the role we had in trying to convince both sides to allow it to happen. That's a touchy situation where relief comes in to the other side and one is likely to regard that as assisting the enemy. We helped get it done.

We have tried to broker contacts between the two sides. We thought we had a summit meeting arranged between Prime Minister Sadiq and John Garang last year. Sadiq agreed, Garang didn't. There have been a lot of times when one side is ready for something and for one reason or another the other side backs off. If indeed the government finally comes though and accepts this DUP-SPLA proposal in the light of these recent victories by the SPLA, we are going to have to hope that the SPLA will stick with the proposal. We have done a lot, both on peace and relief.

In regard to contacts with the Soviets, this is something the administration is seized with at all levels. Certainly Secretary Baker, himself, has taken an interest in this, as has been reflected by his statement on Sudan, and he asked for an early assessment of our policy in the Horn. So I think that discussions at high levels as well as at working levels are certainly in the cards.

Mr. **Emerson**. Well, I accept all that. I guess I do come back to Congressman Wolf's point that he has recommended that a special Ambassador be appointed to go over there to negotiate with both sides. That's taking it a step higher in the process than it is currently being dealt with on a daily basis. Your response has been: well, maybe we'll think about it and consider it. What I am saying is that a couple of million people are starving to death and the need is urgent. I'm sure that it is adequate that we let normal processes work their way. I think maybe some extraordinary action needs to be taken.

I think that Congressman Wolf has perhaps injected a very feasible note here: let's lay aside the current means of communication and way of dealing with this problem and send someone who is of internationally recognized stature over there to try to negotiate the thing. We would hope that in the new climate that exists with the Soviet Union that they would be cooperative in our pressing toward that end and we would get all elements in Sudan on board.

Mr. **Brown**. We are certainly seized with the urgency of the situation, sir. We have made known repeatedly that our good offices are available. We can't of course force the two sides to come together.

Your point about the visibility of a high level envoy is certainly a good one and one that well may be at some point the way to go. The circumstances have got to be right and we may want to do it. We just don't think that right now we would have the effect that we would want right now. Obviously that is what we want to have is effectiveness.

Mr. EMERSON. Who's making that determination? Has Secretary Baker made that determination?

Mr. BROWN. Secretary Baker is aware of the proposal that there be a high level envoy appointed, sir.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much.

Bill, I would like to thank you for your excellent questions and suggestions. The resolution that we are going to be marking up or the subcommittee will be marking up after this includes a special envoy provision in it and makes that suggestion very strongly. We would be delighted if you came on and cosponsored that resolution with us. We have a broad bipartisan support, including Mr. Burton, who is on the subcommittee, cosponsoring that with us.

Mr. EMERSON. I would be delighted to do that.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

I guess I said when I made my opening remarks something about that we sin when we are silent. In your opening remarks you said that we weren't sitting idly by and we weren't silent. I saw a little girl who was about 12 years old. She hadn't eaten in so long they were trying to feed her. She couldn't swallow any more. Finally, her grandfather had to put his hand over her mouth and her nose to close her air passages so that she could die. They didn't think that we were very aggressive.

We think about our own circumstances in our own communities and things that are very much in the news today and we look around and see things going on like child abuse and we say: gee, how could that go on in that community or that neighborhood with nobody speaking out aggressively against it? I guess people are reluctant sometimes to speak out against their friends.

If somebody was in my neighborhood I would like to think that if they were beating and abusing their children to the point of possible death that I wouldn't be too concerned about the fact that they are my friends, because they wouldn't be. I would want to do everything in my power as a human being and I would hope that we all would to make sure that that doesn't continue. I'd pull every alarm and every bell and make every phone call and do everything I could emotionally and physically to prevent that from happening.

I'm not sure what it means when our administration tells us that they are pursuing this matter aggressively. Maybe you could flesh that out a little bit for us.

Mr. BROWN. I think there is always a question of trying to decide what the proper balance is between one's private diplomacy and one's public declarations. What we have been aiming for is effectiveness. We haven't been aiming for publicity and credit and there may be, indeed, hungry people in Sudan who don't know that the food that they get comes from the United States. That's not what is important. What's important is that the food gets there. We're looking for what is effective and that's been——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is the food getting there? Are you saying the food is getting there?

Mr. BROWN. I'm saying that some of the food is getting there and I'm saying that the extent to which it is getting there has been to a large extent due to the efforts of the United States. Not enough food is getting there. No. Not enough. My colleagues here can go into details as to what is getting there and how far short that will fall of the needs. What I am telling you is that we have worked hard and will continue to work hard——

Mr. ACKERMAN. We understand that there is food in the country but there is a difference between the grain piling up in pharaoh's warehouses and the starvation of the slaves. There is a tremendous difference between that. The food getting there in country is not necessarily feeding the people who are starving. The evidence is piled up in bodies of skeletons. If we're talking about a quarter to a half million people who have starved to death, I don't know where the food is going.

Ms. TAFT. If I may answer, sir. We will submit for the record the level of food requirements that we expect will be needed for the rainy season. There is food getting in every single day—into Juba. There has recently been a major influx——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Was Juba a U.S. effort?

Ms. TAFT. You bet. Sure. Juba. We are funding into Juba, the EEC is funding into Juba, World Food Program is funding into Juba.

Mr. ACKERMAN. World Food Program is funded by the U.N. isn't it?

Ms. TAFT. Yes, but——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Is it ours?

Ms. TAFT. It's U.S. food. A lot of it is U.S. food. We have——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Did we donate it or did they just have to buy it here?

Ms. TAFT. Sure. Wait a second. Let me explain to you—the United States has provided $43 million worth of food for——

Mr. ACKERMAN. When was this?

Ms. TAFT. Well, this has been in the past year. We have provided——

Mr. ACKERMAN. But Mr. Brown testified before the Senate hearing last week that we only had $10 million worth of leverage.

Ms. TAFT. No, no, no, no. We're talking about the——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Well, help me out. You've got me real confused.

Ms. TAFT. I will help you out. Please——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I mean those Senators didn't know to ask the question but he said we had $10 million worth of leverage over there. Nobody said anything and now you're telling me that we got $43 million worth of food.

Ms. TAFT. Wait a second——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Either we're buying real smart or something is wrong.

Mr. BROWN. I was talking about bilateral economic assistance.

Ms. TAFT. He was talking about development assistance programs.

There have been six disasters that my office has been involved in the last 2 years in Sudan. That includes floods, it includes locust, it includes starving people throughout the Kordofan, Darfur, and throughout southern Sudan. Let me explain to you in terms of the food. We have provided $25 million worth of food for the northern part of southern Sudan which includes Kordofan, Darfur, a number of places like Abyei, Aiwel. We have a map for you that you will be able to see. We have provided $17 million of food for the south. Quite a lot of it has come from Kenya which flies into Juba and places like that. So, we have a network of food, some of which is still prepositioned in Port Sudan.

We have just let a grant to CARE to move the food from Port Sudan so that it is prepositioned in all the places where it needs to be: Kosti, Muglad, Babanusa, El Meiram, and Abyei. It is an 800 mile pipeline from Port Sudan to the places where the displaced persons are or are expected to flow in the next 2 or 3 months.

Our policy is to use the food that we have to try to increase that by swapping wheat for sorghum, which the Government of Sudan has and which we have not got the agreement on and is one of the things that I am going work on next week, so that we can get more food prepositioned. Our position is that we have food. We have our food. We have sorghum that we can swap. This is all emergency food. This is not part of the DA program. It is not part of the ESF program. This is all emergency food from Public Law 480, Food for Peace and assistance from OFDA. That is not leverage. We don't plan to use that leverage against the Government of Sudan for peace. We need those resources and that food to feed people.

In Abyei, for instance, Abyei is a very key town. In September we sent a special team out because we agreed a lot of things weren't happening. We went out there and we said what needs to be done. We got $3 million and we sent some very terrific logisticians out there to say: get things moving. They opened up Abyei. We got airlifts to Abyei—this is the United States—airlifts to Abyei.

We funded a number of NGO's, European NGO's, because there were no U.S. NGO's in towns like Babanusa, El Meiram, and Muglad, which were handling assistance to displaced persons. We gave them money. We gave them radios. We provided them food.

We provided funds to the RRC of Sudan which is really the coordinator for relief activities. We said: you're really responsible for prepositioning people and assistance. They have been very helpful in doing that.

We have provided money to UNICEF for wells and fresh water. We have provided medicines through UNICEF and other donors. We are doing it in Aiwel. We have planes for Aiwel, Abyei, and all of these towns as well as in Juba.

We just gave a grant to start flying food from Khartoum down to Juba. We now have planes that are going from Khartoum to Juba, from Nairobi, from Entebbe. Every available effort is being made. Let me give you an example of what happens: because of the new insecurity around Juba, the planes can't get in. We've got the planes and we've got the food and there's an international donor mechanism at work, but they can't reach the people.

Mr. WOLPE. Would the gentleman yield for just a moment?

Mr. ACKERMAN. I'd be delighted to yield.

Mr. WOLPE. On the subject of Abyei, my understanding is that Save the Children and OXFAM have both pulled out, leaving the Belgian nongovernment organization still operating. My understanding is that the reason they pulled out had to do with government harassment and the difficulties of working within that area. Could you comment on the reasons for their pulling out?

Ms. **Taft**. Yes, sir. There has been a problem with travel permits and registration from some of the NGO's. Save the Children, UK, and OXFAM are not currently in Aiwel where they had been in—I guess it was—Abyei.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Abyei.

Ms. **Taft**. Abyei. We are very concerned about this——

Mr. **Wolpe**. Do you know the reasons for their——

Ms. **Taft**. We have expressed our strong concern—not only strong concern, but really quite a lot of pressure with other donors—about this issue.

The PVO's in preparation for the conference next week in Khartoum have prepared their own list of requirements and demands including the issue of registration and travel access. These will be publicly debated next week and we've got to get approvals.

Those are the types of things the Government of Sudan could make happen, which are within their jurisdiction, and we're very strongly supporting that happening.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you.

Mr. **Ackerman**. I want to piggyback on that exact same point. It seems that when the staff delegation was in the Sudan in late October, they visited displaced persons living right outside of Khartoum. Many of them were just living on top of the garbage heaps literally. Children who were malnourished and in horrible conditions—you know the picture. The food was there but the government blocked the distribution of the food in dozens of ways—every way that they had. They didn't issue the permits, the resources were denied, et cetera, et cetera. I don't understand the explanation to this. Why aren't we using leverage? We certainly didn't mind beating the crap out of the Ethiopians in every way that we could. We gave these people more than a $100 million last year. That is more than we give to any sub-Saharan African country.

Ms. **Taft**. May I give——

Mr. **Ackerman**. Why aren't we screaming about this? Because they are our friends? They're killing their children.

Ms. **Taft**. We are feeding their children. The United States——

Mr. **Ackerman**. We're trying to feed their children but we're also encouraging them to continue their current policies. We're not using the leverage that we have.

Ms. **Taft**. I don't know——

Mr. **Ackerman**. We've given them $1.74 billion since 1980, including the 1990 request. This is abominable. We're asking since 1989 for an increase of 700 percent in military aid and a decrease of 60 percent in economic assistance. This isn't aggressive. It's collusion.

Ms. **Taft**. I will defer to my colleague from State Department on that issue, but I want to set the record straight on the displaced person question and the role of the U.S. Government. We have worked so hard, so consistently, in being the leaders in pressing these issues and working out practical solutions.

Last year, there was a major flood in Khartoum as you well know. We responded fulsomely to that flood, but we also were going to help these displaced persons which we had not had access to previously. It was the government that restricted some access to the displaced persons. Simultaneously, the United Nations did sent out a team to deal with the host country and the donors on displaced persons and came up with a plan of action for assistance both for those in Khartoum and elsewhere. The total bill was $73 million. The U.S. Government has spent $52 million of the $73 million requirement. That doesn't mean that it is enough——

Mr. **Ackerman**. Understand me, Ms. Taft. I don't quarrel at all with your personal commitment and dedication to this issue.

Ms. **Taft**. It's not my—it is the U.S. Government that is doing this. We are energetically——

Mr. **Ackerman**. I'm not talking about your personal energy. I'm not talking about what we say. I'm not talking about what we tell them that we are going to do. I'm not talking about our encouragement. I'm not talking about the things that we whisper to them ever so gently. I think it's said so quietly that we expect them to read our lips and they can't even speak the language. I'm talking not about speaking softly. I'm talking about the big stick. I'm talking about the dollar. I'm talking about $100 million. I'm talking about $1.74 billion. Why aren't we waving this stick? Why aren't we telling them that they ain't gettin' no more money from Uncle Sam unless they move that food into the mouths of the people who need it? Otherwise, it is a charade. It's a shell game. We're moving food silos all over the place but nobody is getting fed.

Mr. Chairman; I'm sorry.

Mr. **Wolpe**. It's OK.

Mr. Ackerman, if I may at this point, I would like to make a couple of brief observations. I'm going to ask the indulgence of my colleagues on the committee.

We are about to be within reach of a quorum here and it is going to be important to act upon the resolution that is before us. Before doing so, there are just a couple of comments to be made. I'm going to ask that we might suspend questions just for a moment in order to do that.

First of all let me say in, following up on Mr. Ackerman's comments just now, that while I have enormous respect for the work that you and the OFDA have done in aggressively trying to make certain that people weren't going to die under very difficult circumstances for a long period of time, I do not share the broader judgment that this administration or our Government more generally has done one-half of what it should, or one-tenth of what it should have done over the last 2 or 3 years. That has been on the record. Mr. Leland and I have had hearings in the past; this administration was willing to do one thing in Ethiopia but totally different kinds of initiatives with respect to Sudan. I think it was utterly inexcusable. That is history, however.

As I said at the outset in my opening statement, I have been very encouraged by a new tone and a new emphasis as espoused by Secretary Baker in his important statement just a short while ago and by what I sense to be a new energy and new attention by the other elements of the administration outside of the OFDA as it relates to the Sudan. So I don't want to look back historically. But I am anxious, as I am sure you are, to try to take those steps which prevent further death and suffering.

In that connection the most immediate two things we can do is, first, enact a resolution—I am going to ask Mr. Ackerman to explain in just a second. Second, the other major event that is in front of us at this point is the March 8–9 United Nations Khartoum conference on emergency relief. I want the record to lay out, and I assume that this will be in accord with what the administration would be pursuing, some key flag points that we need to be attentive to.

One is the government and the SPLA must commit themselves to the principles of open roads, of air corridors, of river routes, and the use of unescorted convoys flagged by the United Nations or the ICRC.

Second, there must be a comprehensive operational plan for the delivery of relief prepared. Astonishingly, the Government of Sudan does not yet even have such a blueprint.

Third, the relationship between the Government of Sudan and those external indigenous private and voluntary organizations, which seek to provide relief, must be clarified. For too long, PVO's have been left in the dark, harassed, and delayed in their operations. It is essential that government streamline the procedures for authorizing PVO's to operate. Confusing and overlapping administrative procedures have seriously impeded relief.

Fourth, the RRC must be upgraded to cabinet status. So, too, an administrative level steering committee must be created which has the actual political authority to mobilize key resources that up to this point have not been available—trains and barges and fuel and planes.

The last two points—the government policy toward the movement of displaced persons must be clarified. If the Government of Sudan is to move the displaced, for example, from Khartoum to southern Kordofan with the support of the United States and other donors, we have to be absolutely certain that it is carried out on a strictly voluntary basis.

Finally, the Government of Sudan must bring control over the militias that it began arming in 1985. It makes no sense to position relief in southern Kordofan and then have the displaced populations preyed upon by militias in those areas.

It seems to me that those are the essential elements of what I hope will emerge from this conference that you will be participating in directly in a very few days.

Ms. TAFT. If I might interject—I think that shows how closely we all work. I have in front of me our draft of what are the principles of relief that we want to have come out of this. We have shared it with the U.N. and the other donors. These are the specifics of a plan that will show us measurable achievements and they include specific metric tons to certain sites. It includes the allocation of Sudanese pounds to certain activities. It's specific. It has about 15 points in it and, in addition to that, it does include all the issues you point to except the militia. I must say that is not in here. I will be glad to share it with you.

I also would like very much on behalf of the government to extend a welcome to any member who would like to go to this conference next week. I think that one of the problems, not only for us and for other donors, has been the short time fuse from the time they first agreed on a date and actually got the invitations out which was only last week.

We are very concerned that you and all the participants not view this as an exercise in mirrors. We want things to happen. I want you to have confidence in the process—at least the U.S. participation. Any ideas that you have in addition to what you have mentioned that you would like to see as the outcome, let us know. If you, sir, would like to join me—I know you invited me to go with you before. I would welcome that and we will make the offer to Senators as well.

Mr. **WOLPE**. Let me thank you for that. I hope that there will be some Members of Congress who might be in a position to avail themselves of that invitation.

At this point, I'm going to yield to Mr. Ackerman.

We will return to the questions later but since we are within reach of a quorum with one person on the way, I would like to act on the resolution and then return to additional questions.

Is there an objection?

Mr. Emerson, did you have a——

Mr. **EMERSON**. I would just like to make a quick comment if I could.

Mr. **WOLPE**. Sure.

Mr. **EMERSON**. As I'm sitting here thinking about this and looking at this resolution—first of all, I don't think it is fair for us to beat up on Ms. Taft. She is one of the finest public servants in the business of public service.

Mr. **WOLPE**. I hope you understood that my intention is to affirm just what you have said.

Mr. **EMERSON**. I do understand.

Second, she said that she would like to visit with you and with Chairman Leland, and I applaud that, because there are some things that Members of Congress can do that in a stratified, bureaucratic situation they are not able to accomplish.

It occurs to me, in view of Mr. Wolf's suggestion to send an individual over there, that in the process of marking up maybe you could change that to a delegation. If we included Mr. Wolf, Mr. Wolpe, Mr. Leland, Mr. Burton, and Mr. Ackerman, we would have the entire spectrum of political opinion in the Congress who thinks that this problem needs to be dealt with from the human prospective. Leave bureaucracy, the State Department and the Congress out of it. This total spectrum of political philosophy in the House of Representatives says: feed these people. If those five people could go over and knock heads and get it done, more power to them.

I am not generally one who believes that we should delegate the foreign policy of the United States to the Congress. As a matter of fact, I am a very strong critic of Congress' tendency to meddle too much. I think this is a problem that goes beyond the normal bounds of how we operate and that that is an approach that might be considered. You might ask Secretary Baker if he would send a delegation of total philosophical spectrum of the Congress over there to try to knock some heads and get the problem solved.

Mr. **WOLPE**. Mr. Emerson, thank you for that. I think that we will sit down with Ms. Taft and with the State Department and see if there are some specific kinds of initiatives that might be undertaken by our colleagues in the Congress on a bipartisan basis. I think that is an important direction.

Chairman **Leland**. Mr. Chairman, I know that we are pressed for time.

Let me join in with my colleague from Missouri in commending Ms. Taft for the great job that she has done and the spirit in which she cooperates with the Select Committee on Hunger and the Subcommittee on Africa. She has done an outstanding job. I hope I can speak for my colleague, Mr. Ackerman, in saying that I think that he has some very strong emotions as we all do, at this impasse that we see, and the problems we have realized in the past trying to make government move, not only in the instance of Sudan, but in many others as well. I do not believe that he meant this personally. I saw the pain and frustration on the part of Ms. Taft. We are all very frustrated and depressed to some extent about the exacerbated situation there with the Government of Sudan refusing to do what is right by its own citizens.

Ms. **Taft**. It works both ways though. The SPLA has not been very helpful at all. They are the ones now that have the power and the access in the south. It is going to be very interesting to see how willing they are to help the large numbers of people that are in the garrison towns. Also, I appreciate your comments but I am only me. You, as individuals, are so effective because you have your staff people. I have a whole network of people in OFDA, in A.I.D., in the State Department, and in the missions that work on this in Addis, in Nairobi, in A.I.D., and Khartoum. It is a network and I happen to be the spokesperson often or the "stuckee" as I often say. It is not one person. It is a commitment that we share widely throughout the U.S. Government and we are as frustrated as you are that we are not always successful but we sure are trying.

Chairman **Leland**. Part of the responsibility is on the SPLA and part is on the Government of Sudan.

Ms. **Taft**. Yes.

[Whereupon, the committees recessed to consider the markup of a resolution by the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa.]

Mr. **Wolpe**. The joint hearing of the Select Committee on Hunger and the Subcommittee on Africa will now resume.

I said that if there are other members who did have last questions they wish to ask we will do so. We are going to conclude this hearing within 5 minutes. Are there any further questions?

Mr. Payne.

Mr. **Payne**. This is not so much a question. I, too, would hope that with this new administration there could be more attention given to the Continent of Africa. With its problems continuing and escalating and with allocations to the continent not increasing, I think that we're going to find we are going to run into very, very serious problems. There is the whole ecological question about deforestation, the whole question of unclean water, and the whole health care situation—AIDS which is spreading in Africa.

I would just hope the administration might look at the possibility of less guns and all. You know you can't eat guns and you can't cure anybody with them. You can't help anybody with guns. If we would shift off the guns and the little armored trucks that we send around and get into ambulances, more medicines and cures, I would be very, very pleased. Hopefully, we can move into that direction as we see the new kinder and gentler stuff we talk about.

Thank you. That's all I have to say.

Mr. Wolpe. Thank you very much, Mr. Payne.

Let me indicate that two of our colleagues could not be here today because of medical emergencies in their families. Mr. Dorgan's father is very ill and my distinguished ranking member, Mr. Burton's, son is undergoing an operation today. That is the reason for their absence from this hearing.

Are there any other last questions?

Chairman Leland. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to offer Mr. Dorgan's full statement for the record if we could ask for unanimous consent that that be included in the record.

Mr. Wolpe. Without objection it will be entered in the record at this time.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dorgan appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 46.]

Chairman Leland. Let me ask one question, Mr. Chairman, of Ms. Taft.

Ms. Taft, Mr. Winter has received a specific request for funding from NPA that you alluded to earlier and the PVO are in a position to move food now to Kapoeta and other sites. Will your office fund this request?

Ms. Taft. If I can read this. I just received this yesterday and Congressman Wolf gave me his copy this morning. The bottom of this says I am prepared to work with appropriate personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi or whomever you say designates to prepare a formal, detailed proposal. All he says in this is that he would like $500,000 to position food for the civilians between Juba and Koepeta.

One of the things we have to do is find out how many there are. When Torit presumably was taken the other day, it is my understanding they only had 300 people in Torit. We were prepared to do our airdrop in Torit for up to 5,000 people. So, I don't know what we are talking about.

We have arrangements for medicines, we have arrangements for other commodities. It said food, if necessary. They do not need food now through MPA.

I would like to talk to you as soon as we adjourn about this and other proposals. We are pleased that this appears to be a change of policy on the part of Egil Hagen. One of the questions that we have had is how well have the PVO's coordinated with the SRRA and with themselves and the U.N. in Nairobi, which is a key area.

I had sent out my assistant director for Africa, Bill Garberlink, in January to review the situation. He then accompanied the PVO team that we sent out. They all found that there was a lack of coordination there. As a result of that the Africa Bureau of A.I.D. is sending out Hunter Farnam from their staff to go and help catalyze better coordination.

Our sense is that we have got to work together on this. One of the issues that has been raised is the extent to which this person presents a capacity beyond one person. I think that is the judgment we need to make.

Chairman Leland. Thank you, Ms. Taft.

I want to thank both panels for their contribution today.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your contribution and for your cooperation with the Select Committee on Hunger.

Mr. **Wolpe**. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As always, it has been a delight to work with you and your select committee.

My appreciation also goes to our witnesses and to the members of our two committees that were with us this morning.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 1:49 p.m., the committees were adjourned, to reconvene at the call of their respective Chairs.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BYRON L. DORGAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA

My colleagues and I are joined not by politics but by a common and a deepening concern for the plight of many thousands of Sudanese civilians who are suffering an unimaginable horror as a result of the political dissent and civil war which divides their country. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese face an imminent peril of starvation--a fate which has already claimed the lives of great numbers of Sudanese people. This tragedy has no origin in drought or disaster but, instead, stems from political division.

MANMADE FAMINE

There is no shortage of those who share the blame for this outrage. The rebel forces have blown up relief convoys, shot down planes sent by donor organizations and committed additional utterly indefensible acts, which have effectively precluded relief agencies from reaching those in desperate need. The Government of the Sudan has erected barrier upon barrier to deny food and medical relief to those of questionable political affiliation. Relief agencies have been expelled by the government, permission to launch relief operations denied, and resources available for hungry civilians have been diverted to the military.

Indicative of this callous indifference to the plight of hungry southerners is the condition of the million plus displaced who have sought refuge in and around Khartoum, the capital city. In Khartoum, the government cannot claim that the S.P.L.A. interferes with relief efforts or that the displaced are otherwise inaccessible. But in Khartoum the displaced live in the most wretched existence conceivable--many encamped on garbage dumps, most without adequate water, all without sufficient food, medicine and shelter. The government does little for these people and limits what the international community is allowed to do.

The independent militias of the Sudan, armed by the government supposedly to fight the rebel forces, maraud the countryside--robbing, stealing, and burning villages. The militias capture children who are systematically sold into slavery. Based on tribal or religious affiliation, civilians, sometimes the entire population of villages, are summarily executed.

It is also important to note that the international community's stance in face of this expanding tragedy in the Sudan has been less than courageous at times. The Sudan traditionally has been the largest recipient of United States foreign assistance in Sub-Saharan Africa, but only recently, and only in the face of strong Congressional and media criticism, has the State Department felt compelled to speak out against the government's actions which preclude effective relief. Our European allies, all with considerable influence in the Sudan, have been similarly silent.

Evidence surfaces almost daily documenting the harsh reality that the parties to the political and military conflict in the Sudan--the government, the militias allied with the government, the rebels of the S.P.L.A. (Sudanese People's Liberation Army) locked in a long-term struggle against the government--are all only too willing to use food as a weapon in that conflict. Consequently, several million residents of the southern regions of the country have been displaced from their homes, their farms, their livelihoods.

As many as one million Sudanese have starved to death since the struggle began in 1983. The toll in 1988 alone exceeded a quarter of a million people. This is a remarkable statistic: 250,000 or more non-combatants died last year in the southern regions of the Sudan from starvation or from the infectious diseases which preyed upon the malnourished victims of the warfare. A large percentage of those who died were children. In several displaced persons camps in the Sudan, there are no children under age three present--the infants and young children have all died from starvation or epidemic.

The politics of silence and manipulation have conspired to wreak havoc on the people of the Sudan. I underscore that this is not the chaos of a runaway stock market where speculators lose their investments, but the severing of a lifeline whereby parents lose their children.

FROM SILENCE TO ACTION

But we can be silent no longer. It is imperative that there be no doubt concerning the policies of the United States Government in regards to the horrible famine stalking the Sudan. We cannot accept the use of food as a political weapon by any party. We cannot remain silent when innocent children are dying as a result of conflict not of their making or comprehension. We cannot accept the notion that some people are beyond reach or that the situation is too complicated. We must redouble efforts to honor long-standing American humanitarian traditions which require that no options are overlooked, and no avenues left unexplored, as we strive to guarantee that no more of these children starve to death.

So I urge the Bush Administration to take prompt and decisive action to help remove the obstacles to relief, to use its influence to get all parties involved working together to feed starving Sudanese.

May I also encourage my colleagues to join several of us on the Committee in cosponsoring legislation which calls for a vigorous, nonpolitical effort to tackle immediately the pressing needs of the people of Sudan.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

MR. CHAIRMAN: Sudan is once again in the grip of a terrible famine that has killed hundreds of thousands, but this time the culprit is civil war. Even more frustrating than the return of hunger to that country is the difficulties the civil war is creating in helping those in need. The civil war is not only causing the famine but is preventing the international community from fully employing the lessons in disaster relief that we learned during the last famine in 1984 and 1985.

It appears that both sides in the civil war are guilty of using food as a political weapon. The SPLA in the South has shot down relief aircraft and blocked food convoys, while the Khartoum government has been grossly inefficent. Many Sudanese officials appear to be indifferent to the plight of civilians, and some apparently have blocked the delivery of food intended for people on the other side.

During our hearing today I hope to get a better appreciation of the difficulties facing our aid people who are being forced to work in a war zone. It is my understanding that even the International Committee of the Red Cross, which has more experience than any other group in helping civilians suffering from war, has had difficulty operating in Sudan. I also understand that many of the private voluntary organizations, which did such a magnificent job in Ethiopia and Sudan during the 1984-85 famine, have been reluctant to risk their people and operations in war-torn Sudan.

Despite these problems, the United States has not stood idly by. Over a year ago Mrs. Julia Taft of the U.S. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance told me of her agency's efforts to stockpile food in areas surrounding the southern Sudan. The United States has also supported ICRC and United Nations relief operations. It is safe to say that the United States has done more than any other country or group to help the people of Sudan.

Despite these efforts, however, hundreds of thousands have died. I am therefore lead to conclude that Secretary of State James Baker is correct when he said that the starvation will not end until the fighting ends. In this regard, I will be interested in hearing from our State Department witness about the initiatives--and limitations--that are guiding our efforts to achieve a cease fire and negotiated settlement. I understand that there might be some recent developments in this regard.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would urge caution upon those who are quick to condemn the United States for not doing more or not being more vocal. In the delicate world of diplomacy, what is not seen is often as important as what is seen. Just because we did not read about it in the New York Times does not mean it did not happen.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. WOLF, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify here this morning. As you know, in January I traveled to northern and southern Sudan as well as Ethiopia in order to gain a full understanding of how famine conditions there were affecting that region of Africa. The images I saw were the same images that haunted millions of Americans during the Ethiopian famine in 1985. The two differ, however, in an important way -- the tragedy in Sudan is caused by civil war and the use of food as a weapon by opposing sides. The Ethiopian famine was the result of natural phenomena.

The tragedy in Sudan is one that should concern all Americans and I congratulate your efforts, Mr. Wolpe and Mr. Leland, in holding this hearing to focus attention in Congress and in the country on the suffering.

Perhaps through your efforts and the efforts of Senator Simon and his committee in the Senate, more people will begin to take notice of Sudan and its problems.

Before I begin to discuss my trip to Sudan and some of my observations, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one additional comment.

In Soviet Armenia, between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in early December as a result of a tragic earthquake. Nearly constant television and newspaper coverage moved people throughout the world who contributed time, money and resources to help those who were suffering. This was an appropriate response that reflected compassion and understanding.

But in Sudan, some 500,000 (and perhaps as many as a million) people, the equivalent of the entire population of the city of Pittsburgh plus 75,000 more, died during 1988 as a result of the famine and few have taken notice. Except for a few newspapers like the Atlanta Constitution and The Washington Post there have been few news stories. The electronic media have largely ignored this tragedy. Perhaps if there were more news stories and more coverage, more efforts would be aimed at helping the people in both northern and southern Sudan.

With the Chairman's permission, rather than using the Committee's time reciting what I saw in the Sudan, I would like to insert in the record a report I prepared which details my observations. Suffice to say that the conditions I witnessed were terrible and the suffering immense.

The Bush Administration has shown a deep sensitivity to the problems in Sudan. When I briefed Secretary of State James Baker on my trip to Sudan, just days after he was sworn in, he was well versed about the political and relief situation.

He quickly dealt with the problem by issuing a strong statement calling on the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to ensure that food reaches people in all parts of Sudan. The statement also called for an early cease fire to promote peace and allow relief to reach those in need.

Most recently, the U.S. has provided food and supplies for cross-border operations into southern Sudan.

In response to the Administration's actions the Sudanese embassy announced recently that some 2,800 tons of relief materials have been delivered to towns in southern Sudan since January and 61 barges loaded with relief supplies are enroute to Malakal, an area deeply affected by the famine.

In addition, the Sudanese government has indicated a willingness to seek peace.

These are very positive steps which have undoubtedly helped to relieve the suffering of thousands of Sudanese and will undoubtedly save the lives of many thousand more in the coming year.

I believe the Bush Administration has a unique opportunity to influence the peace process in Sudan. Peace is the one missing link that will eliminate the crisis in Sudan that threatens so many thousand people.

With all of the positive steps that have been taken thus far, a cease fire agreement which opens the roads and allows the free passage of food in both northern and southern Sudan could be the step that ensures there is little or no famine in Sudan in 1989. Hundreds of thousands of lives could be saved.

I have recommended to the Administration that the U.S. appoint an individual with a thorough understanding of Africa and its politics -- a peace envoy of sorts -- to negotiate between both sides of the Sudanese conflict in order to achieve a cease fire and open roads policy that will allow food, medicine and supplies to reach all parts of Sudan.

Such an appointment will send a powerful message to the world and the people of Sudan that the U.S. is committed to preventing a humanitarian disaster of the type that occured in Sudan last year. More importantly, it would provide the framework for the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army to begin to iron out their differnces. This could only lead to improved conditions for all people in Sudan.

I sensed during my visit, Mr. Chairman, that the people of Sudan, from both the north and the south, are tired of the fighting. They are beginning to recognize that the war, which costs the Government of Sudan about $1 million a day, is the cause of many of that nation's problems.

Lastly, Mr. Chairman, I recommend that the U.S. government ask the Soviet Union to urge the SPLA to reach a cease fire agreement with the Government of Sudan. The Soviet Union has a close relationship with Ethiopia and Ethiopia serves as a base for SPLA activities. Soviet influence on the SPLA combined with constructive U.S. intervention in the form of a peace negotiatior could have dramatic benefits in reaching a cease fire accord in time to avoid the tragedy that will come with the rainy season in April.

Mr. Chairman, the situation in Sudan is changing rapidly. Earlier this week Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq Mahdi told parliament that he would resign unless the armed forces allowed him to form a new government to work for peace in Sudan.

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> "The objective is peace, and peace will be easier to achieve if we rally around it at home."

These changes are the reult of action by many different people and organizations. This hearing will have a positive effect. Roger Winter's work with the U.S. Committee for Refugees has had a positive effect. The staff delegation fact-finding trip to that region with Jeff Clark, Steve Morrison, Ann Schonfield and David Lonie has had a positive effect. The efforts of the Bush Administration have had a positive effect.

The key, however, to a long-term solution is peace and that is what we should be working for.

SUDAN

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

By

Congressman Frank R. Wolf
January 30, 1989

In Soviet Armenia, between 50,000 and 100,000 people died in early December as a result of a tragic earthquake. Nearly constant television and newspaper coverage moved people throughout the world who contributed time, money and resources to help those who were suffering. This was an appropriate response that reflected compassion and understanding.

In Sudan in Africa, some 500,000 (and perhaps as many as a million) people, the equivalent of the entire population of Pittsburgh plus 75,000 more, died during 1988 as a result of famine fueled by civil war between the Moslem north and the mostly Christian or animist south. Despite the massive suffering occurring in Sudan, few news stories have captured the public's attention and the situation continues to worsen.

During the first week of January I travelled to Sudan, Ethiopia and Kenya to obtain a comprehensive view of this situation. No member of Congress had previously travelled to rebel held territory in southern Sudan and I was the first member of Congress to visit any part of Sudan in nearly three years.

In the camps that I visited in northern and southern Sudan and on the Ethiopia-Sudan border, I found many of the same images that haunted millions of Americans during the Ethiopian famine in 1985. The two differ, however. The tragedy in Sudan is caused by civil war and opposing sides use food as a weapon. The Ethiopian famine was the result natural of phenomena.

Observations

I viewed the situation in Sudan from three viewpoints: the refugee situation in northern Sudan and in southern Sudan and the situation in refugee camps in Ethiopia along the Sudan border.

SOUTHERN SUDAN

The situation in southern Sudan, an area held mostly by rebel troops of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA), is potentially critical.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the United Nations, private relief organizations, the United States and other western nations have provided a large amount of food and medical supplies to northern Sudan. Little of these supplies, however, have reached the south.

The population of southern Sudan is approximately 7 million of which some 250,000 died in 1988. Little more is known about the number of displaced people or the food situation in this region.

Few relief organizations are operating in the south and beyond these limited efforts, little aid is reaching the south. Several relief experts in Sudan told me that it is likely that there are large pockets in this region where little or no food is available.

I travelled with the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) to Kapoeta in southern Sudan to observe relief operations there. There are an estimated 30,000 refugees in camps scattered around Kapoeta. These residents have come from miles around, many walking for weeks and even months to reach food and shelter. The NPA is providing food, medicine and supplies.

Surprisingly, starvation and malnutrition were not widespread in the southern areas relief agencies have reached. I was told, however, that this was not an encouraging sign because it meant that most of the starving people had either died or were attempting to reach feeding camps in the north or in western Ethiopia.

Most importantly, however, relief experts are concerned that 250,000 or more southerners (the entire population of Richmond, Virginia plus many thousand more) could die in the next year if the rainy season arrives in April without adequate arrangements in place to provide food to the affected areas. Rain will make roads, already in poor condition, nearly impassable and will make dirt airstrips unuseable. The weakened condition of those who survived the famine this year could exacerbate the tragedy next year.

ETHIOPIA

In Ethiopia I visited Fugnido camp, one of four refugee camps located near the Sudan border outside the town of Gambela. Hundreds of thousands of Sudanese have trekked from Sudan to these refugee camps in search of food and shelter and respite from the war. It is sadly ironic that the situation in Sudan is so desperate that people will flee to Ethiopia for relief.

The flow of refugees into Ethiopia began in November 1987 and the first arrivals were described as walking skeletons. Since that time the United Nations High Commission for Relief has operated camps to offer assistance.

The case of 9-year old Mayen-Mayen Diye was typical of those I encountered at Fugnido. Mayen and others in his village were attacked by a government armed militia in Aweil. His family had been killed. After the attack, he found himself with about 90 other young boys in the woods. Together with their cattle they walked for five months in search of food and shelter. Of the approximately 90 that began the journey, only about 25 survived it.

The trail that Mayen followed has become known as the trail of corpses because of the large number of Sudanese who died along that route seeking food and shelter. It is said that many refugees located the camps by following the trail of bones.

While the flow of refugees into the camps in Ethiopia has temporarily slowed, Sudanese are still arriving daily, often in poor physical condition ravaged by disease and hunger.

The camp I visited maintained a poorly equipped medical facility for the most seriously malnourished and operated a supplemental feeding program for those who were less seriously malnourished.

The UNHCR has projected a refugee population in the Ethiopia camps of about 320,000. That figure has nearly been reached. As a result, if conditions in Sudan again worsen, as most experts predict they will, and the flow of refugees increases, it is unlikely that the camps in Ethiopia will be able to adequately handle the increased demand.

NORTHERN SUDAN

In northern Sudan there are refugee camps in and around Khartoum serving a refugee population of about 1,000,000. In addition, camps have been established along major refugee routes throughout the north to help take the pressure off camps in Khartoum. The camps contain an estimated 228,500 refugees.

Northern Camps

I viewed several camps in Kosti, a four-hour drive from Khartoum. In Kosti, there are an estimated 65,000 displaced persons, primarily women and children who have fled from the war areas of the south in search of food and shelter.

Combo camp, home to approximately 20,000 Sudanese, was typical of the camps I saw. On the day I visited, 32 new people had arrived from camps further south. One women said she had walked for 5 days from a camp further south to reach Combo. Layia camp, which I also visited, is home to approximately 10,000 Sudanese.

These camps, and others like them, have been established along the refugee route from the south to help take pressure off the already overcrowded camps in Khartoum. In all there are an estimated 228,500 displaced persons in northern regions outside Khartoum and this figure is expected to increase to 330,000 by 1990.

Living conditions in the camps are poor. Relief workers said disease was widespread as was malnutrition. As little as two months ago, hundreds were dying from malnutrition. Food is reaching most of these camps now.

Khartoum Camps

In and around Khartoum there are an estimated 1,000,000 displaced persons. This figure is expected to reach 1.25 million by 1990. As with the camps in Kosti, living conditions are very poor and disease is prevalent. One camp was actually built on top of a city dump. Water is in short supply and housing is cramped and in poor condition.

One AID official told me privately that while there is food reaching the camps, malnutrition levels may still be as high as 25-30 percent because of logistical difficulties in feeding 1,000,000 people every day. This problem will only increase as the number of refugees increase. The results could be even more tragic, however, if food shortages develop.

KHARTOUM GOVERNMENT

The Government of Sudan has not been particularly cooperative in reaching a solution to this tragic situation in the north.

Several private relief organizations were expelled from northern Sudan including World Vision, Lutheran World Federation and others. No official explanation has been given for these expulsions.

Private relief organizations I met with in Khartoum all expressed concern that it is becoming more difficult for private voluntary organizations (PVO's) to operate in Sudan. Annual registration, operating licenses and arbitrary rules have made compliance difficult. One PVO representative told me that if a group gets on the wrong side of any level of government, they could easily be kicked out of the country.

The Sudanese military has armed militias which have been regularly attacking southern Sudanese. These militias, completely independent of military control except for their weapons, are regularly cited by displaced persons for attacks on their families and villages.

The Sudanese government has in many cases prevented food from reaching southern regions arguing that this only provides the enemy with strength to fight. I saw barges loaded with food in Kosti destined for Malakal, a devastated area in the south, which have sat in port for several months because the government has not made arrangements for an escort up the Nile River. Without an escort, the barges would undoubtedly be attacked by either the rebels or even the government army.

A report in the Daily Telegram (London) on January 12 said that at least four persons were dying daily in Malakal and that approximately 6,000 had died in the Bahar al Ghazal and Equatoria regions during the preceeding three weeks.

SUDANESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY

The Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) is also not without fault.

On a number of occasions the SPLA has attacked convoys carrying desperately needed food and medicine. The SPLA has argued that these convoys were carrying primarily military supplies for use in the war. The government has responded that a military escort is necessary when transporting food through a war zone.

The SPLA has also been reluctant to allow relief organizations to enter southern Sudan. As has been noted, only the ICRC and the NPA have accessed the south and vast regions have yet to be explored. One relief organization told me that it was as difficult dealing with the SPLA as with the Government of Sudan.

In late December a private relief plane crashed in southern Sudan. While the cause of the crash is uncertain, some believe the plane may have been shot down by the SPLA. In fairness, however, a substantial number believe that poor weather conditions were the main cause of the crash.

Recommendations

Based on my observations during the trip, the following are my recommendations to help relieve the suffering of the people of Sudan:

1. PUBLIC STATEMENT -- The United States government should make a statement, from the highest level, urging that a cease fire and open roads agreement be reached immediately. Only with a cease fire and open roads can food be delivered safely to both the

north and the south.

There is perhaps a unique opportunity now with the new Administration taking office. President Bush was well thought of by nearly everyone I met and spoke with in east Africa. The Sudanese were especially appreciative of then Vice-President Bush's visit to Sudan in 1985.

Strong condemnation of the war by the Bush Administration and public statements urging a cease fire could be helpful.

2. ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION -- Recognizing the Soviet Union's relationship with Ethiopia (the Soviet Union provides Ethiopia with a significant amount of aid) and Ethiopia's relationship with the SPLA (Ethiopia is the base for SPLA operations), the United States government should ask the Soviet Union to urge the SPLA to reach a cease fire agreement with the government of Sudan.

3. AID COORDINATION -- The Sudan problem really involves three countries: Sudan, Ethiopia (location of over 300,000 Sudanese refugees), and Kenya (base for private relief efforts into southern Sudan). As a result, coordination between U.S. AID personnel at each of the three posts is essential.

AID personnel in each of the three posts are doing an outstanding job in addressing the vast problems they have encountered. To ensure that efforts between the three are conducted efficiently and to generate new and innovative approaches which might not be apparent to any one of the posts, perhaps one person should be designated by AID to coordinate Sudan relief efforts.

4. PEACE ENVOY -- The famine in Sudan is the direct result of civil war. While attempts have been made at a peace accord, they have failed and the people of Sudan continue to suffer.

The United States should unconditionally express its desire that peace be reached and should designate an individual with a thorough understanding of Africa and its politics to negotiate between both sides in order to achieve a cease fire and open roads policy that will allow food to reach all areas of Sudan.

The appointee, either a high ranking government official or esteemed private citizen, should report directly to the Secretary of State on his or her efforts.

This appointment should be made as quickly as possible so that the process can get under way before the rainy season brings more devastation in April.

7-7-7-7

The primary goal should be a cease fire and open roads policy. An end to the war should be the long-term goal.

5. PRIVATE RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS -- The United States should specifically request that the Government of Sudan allow private relief organizations which were expelled from Sudan to return.

Further, the United States should explicitly state its support for private relief organizations and its desire that they be allowed to operate in Sudan without interference and without unnecessary red tape.

A similar message in support of private relief efforts should be sent to the government of Ethiopia.

6. INCENTIVE FOR FAIR USE OF AID -- The United States provides a significant amount of aid to Sudan each year. Sudan should be encouraged to use this aid to feed people in both the north and the south.

The Malakal barges are an example of the Sudanese government failing to provide food to the south and this should not be tolerated.

Some incentive should be designed that will encourage both sides to allow food to reach all the people. For example, Peace Corps activities in Sudan could be resumed if food aid is fairly distributed.

The United States should not threaten to cut off food aid as this will only increase the suffering of the Sudanese people and would reduce the United States to using food as a weapon. In any event, Sudan would merely expect other relief organizations and nations to fill the void the U.S. would create.

7. CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- There have been allegations, so far unsubstantiated, that the Sudanese military have begun to use chemical weapons supplied by Libya of Iraq. The United States should thoroughly investigate the accuracy of these allegations.

If the allegations prove to be accurate, the United States should take all appropriate action to condemn the use of these weapons.

8. MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH LIBYA -- Sudan has a growing military alliance with Libya, its neighbor to the northwest. Soviet Migs line the runway at Khartoum airport and the the SPLA claims to have captured two Mig's and a Libyan pilot.

The United States should express its displeasure over this growing relationship.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROGER P. WINTER, DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Mr. Chairman, thank you for your willingness to consider the views of the U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) on the current humanitarian crisis in the Sudan.

Unlike the Ethiopian crisis of several years ago, the tragedy that is Sudan today is entirely man-made. I returned from east Africa two weeks ago, where my primary focus was on southern Sudan. I can assure you that, while there has been a lot of talk recently about humanitarian needs in that region, and while the U.S. approach to issues of peace and humanitarian need in Sudan has improved perceptively in the last several months, the truth is that on the ground, where the victims are, little has yet changed. And the rains that will make adequate relief efforts immeasurably more difficult, if not impossible, in some locations are only weeks away.

Frankly, someone should write a book on how difficult it has been for this humanitarian emergency, despite its enormity, to come to world attention. We simply should not be working against the tight deadline we now face. The dimensions of the escalating problem were known by the appropriate people in our government and other governments more than a year ago. The spectacle of tens of thousands of emaciated young Dinka men making an extraordinary trek in early 1988 hundreds of miles from Bahr El Ghazal to western Ethiopia, leaving thousands of their dead along the route, was a hard indicator for the international community to miss. So too was the influx of hundreds of thousands of displaced southerners into the least habitable areas of Sudan's major cities, particularly Khartoum.

USCR is a program of the American Council for Nationalities Service.

The media, though in most cases slow to catch on, did catch on. The Atlanta Constitution was on top of the story. The Boston Globe provided excellent coverage. Jim Bitterman and NBC television provided all the visual coverage necessary to trigger the outpouring of human empathy for which the American people have become known. House and Senate staff provided key validation of the media reports and strong advocacy. Congressman Wolf made the effort and took the risk to see for himself. The numbers of dead (300,000 to 500,000 in 1988 alone) were enough to stagger anyone's sensibilities.

We saw in the matter of the tragic earthquake in Armenia how quickly and passionately the American government and people can respond in a humanitarian emergency. Yet somehow, tragically, despite the efforts of many, including the food assistance people in AID and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, in the case of Sudan we are now reduced to racing the calendar.

The civilian population still at risk is very large. It may be usefully described by dividing it into four categories.

The first grouping consists of those who are in civilian concentrations within the SPLA-held zone. Sudan is a very large country, but in the very south, the population is comparatively light. Still, some authorities suggest the SPLA-held territory is about the size of the entire country of Uganda. Within that area, civilian concentrations do exist. The best known is at Kapoeta, close to the Kenya border. There, over 100,000 displaced people inhabit twenty-two feeding sites scattered over a wide area. They are being assisted by a private relief agency, the Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), and have been since last year. World Vision is now an important partner in this operation. Having visited Kapoeta last summer and also two weeks ago, I have had the unique opportunity of seeing how the starving displaced population there has been rehabilitated through a reliable, adequate food supply. Thousands of lives have been saved. In other areas such as Pibor, Boma, and

Pochalla, private relief agencies--European and Australian--are beginning to establish a presence.

Unfortunately, though much is known, no one yet has a comprehensive picture of the needs of civilians elsewhere in the the SPLA-held zone, though the SPLA and its humanitarian relief affiliate, the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Agency (SRRA), seem increasingly eager to have relief initiatives implemented and expanded. The Sudan government has been consistently hostile to efforts to feed civilians in SPLA-held areas. However, several locations have been supplied as part of a package deal between the government, the SPLA, and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Other cross-border operations--from Kenya, Ethiopia, and possibly Uganda--into Sudan will be an indispensable component of an adequate total response.

The second category concerns those located in and around government-held garrison towns in the south. Although there are a number of these, by far the largest is Juba, the capital of the south. The military initiative for some months has clearly been with the SPLA; a half dozen garrison towns have fallen since last autumn. Earlier this week the SPLA reported it had overrun Torit, the last remaining government garrison of any size on the east bank in the deep south. With each government loss, the pressure on Juba increases.

By some estimates, there are 250,000 civilians in and around Juba. Government efforts to feed these civilians have been negligible. Only the World Food Program and private relief agencies have been doing this necessary task, and recently these efforts have been somewhat curtailed. Now that Torit has fallen, unless there is a breakthrough on the peace front, it can be expected that the situation at Juba will tighten quickly. The SPLA appears to have the capacity to shut off air flights into Juba. We should anticipate that significant numbers of civilians will seek to leave Juba, particularly if artillery shelling, which has now begun, becomes common. SPLA radio has been advising civilians to leave the city. They will run in every direction. I believe we should all be working hard now to plan for this possibility, and specifically preparing to handle the complexities of internal transport of relief supplies that will likely become the major problem. The Norwegian People's Aid/World Vision relief operation is well-positioned to respond to this eventuality if adequate resources are made available. This should be done without delay.

The third grouping consists of civilians in insecure but government-held areas in the transition zone between north and south. I am personally less knowledgeable about this large and vulnerable population, but do wish to offer one comment. It is these areas that have been affected by violence caused by indisciplined militias armed by the government of Sudan. It is in these areas that the most flagrant of human rights abuses have occurred and in which gratuitous violence has become common. It may well be that the government let the genie out of the bottle when it armed these elements. In practice, they will make the cease-fire we all hope for extremely difficult to achieve. It will be impossible to entirely disarm these populations. It is likely the arms the government has handed out will kill for decades. Any relief operation must navigate this exceedingly complex situation. It is in these areas that U.S.-sponsored relief efforts have been most visible.

The circumstances in which the fourth group exists are, frankly, the hardest to comprehend. There are a million-and-a-half displaced southerners in and around Khartoum, living the most wretched existence conceivable in their own capital city, many encamped on a garbage dump.

Mr. Chairman, there are no impassable roads to this population. There are no insecure zones. There is no SPLA to foil the attempt of the government or the international community to respond to the humanitarian needs of this population. These people did not just arrive in Khartoum. They have been there for months, in most cases for more than a year. Yet to this day virtually nothing has been done to assist them. This group is the ultimate indicator of the Sudan government's intentions towards its displaced southern citizens.

Since last summer, a long chain of observers has passed through Sudan. All have properly criticized both the government and the SPLA for the use of food as a weapon of war in this conflict. But, it should be noted carefully, virtually all--journalists, relief officials, congressional staff, and even U.S. government officials when speaking off the record--have remarked about the disinterest, even hostility, many in the Sudan government exhibit when confronted with the need to respond to these displaced southern Sudanese. It is this attitude that, I believe, has been the prime frustrator of international relief attempts.

Personally, I have been deeply disturbed by the tentative nature of the U.S. response to the humanitarian situation in Sudan during the last year. There is no question that the U.S. has made attempts and, while limited in terms of success, has perhaps on balance tried to do more in the humanitarian sphere than most others (although Norway and certain other European governments and organizations have been very active). There is no question that the U.S. response has improved qualitatively recently, on both peace and humanitarian issues. I am concerned, however, that it remains too tentative. The statement by Secretary of State Baker on February 7 was superb. Fielding the assessment team was an excellent initiative. But, having now observed the process closely for months, I am concerned that much more must be done very soon.

While many in the Administration are truly exercised over the matter, to this day the U.S. has not done what it could have to understand and respond to needs that can only be handled adequately by cross-border operations in SPLA-held areas. This long-term avoidance makes one wonder about the depth and strength of the U.S. commitment to assist all needy civilians in Sudan.

I am sorry to have to be argumentative on this point. But if we could openly assist civilians in both zones in the Ethiopian situation of 1984-5, we can do so here. If the government in Khartoum cannot fathom an even-handed humanitarian initiative for its starving, displaced southern citizens, the U.S. should seriously reconsider its relationship with that government. This situation is too big and too bad. The United States simply can no longer risk being anything but entirely straightforward and even-handed about the humanitarian issues involved.

The same is true on the peace front. It is important for the United States to shed the geopolitical glasses through which it has viewed this situation, until recently, and to recognise that, while exterior interests have played a role in this conflict, the struggle is essentially between Sudanese. A U.S. role of energetic, honest peace broker, seeking to preserve democratic institutions in Sudan while responding to the just grievances of the south, is exactly where our government should be positioned.

Thank you.



Source: The Minority Rights Group

Yellow = SPLA held, as is much of the
space in between these locations.

NORSK FOLKEHJELP

NORWEGIAN PEOPLE'S AID

Fax transmission

To: Roger P. Winter

FROM: Egil Hagen/NPA/Nairobi

DATE: March 1, 1989

Please pass this emergency $500,000 funding request to the appropriate people at USAID. I intend this as the first step in the formal proposal process.

The fall of Torit will now cause all major military activity in the very south of Sudan to focus on Juba. The SPLA radio is telling civilians there they should leave and head east where they will be cared for. As shelling of Juba increases and also supply by air is curtailed, it is highly likely many of the quarter of a million civilians will try to leave.

As a result, because NPA is in the best position to respond to the needs of civilians between Juba and Kapoeta, it appears inevitable that we must gear up our operation quickly. It is also the case that our current program, including cooperative efforts with World Vision, is not adequately funded to meet existing needs.

We are in immediate need of funds to do this job right. If $500,000 were immediately available, we are in a position to commit it quickly for additional trucks, fuel, spare parts, additional monitors to assure acceptable end use of food, vehicles to support monitors, possible temporary road improvements, select medicines, food as necessary (if current commitments become inadequate), and the costs of running an expanded fleet through the rainy season and foreseeable future. We also need assistance with our administrative costs and will continue to do so, as our program with World Vision does not include such costs.

I am prepared to work with appropriate personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, or whomever USAID designates, to prepare a formal, detailed proposal.

Please advise me how to proceed ASAP.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HOLLY BURKHALTER, AFRICA WATCH, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

HUMAN RIGHTS IN SUDAN

Thank you for holding this important hearing on the situation in Sudan, Chairman Wolpe and Chairman Leland. My name is Holly Burkhalter, and I am associate director of Human Rights Watch, a human rights organization which includes Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch and Helsinki Watch. We appreciate this opportunity to testify about human rights in Sudan. I particularly want to convey the thanks of my organization for your personal involvement in human rights and the excellent work of your respective staff members.

As recent news reports have made clear, Sudan is a human rights disaster. A brutal civil war in the south of the country between government forces and the South People's Liberation Army (SPLA), has been aggravated by a series of devastating natural disasters and a ruined economy. Sudan is hailed as one of the few democracies in the Arab and African worlds. Unfortunately, a generally free press and other democratic institutions have had little relevance to the civil war in the south, where hundreds of thousands have died from starvation and thousands more have been massacred. It is an irony that a country praised for having held free and fair elections and maintaining democratic institutions has one of the worst human rights records in the world.

The political conflicts that underlie Sudan's current human rights problems are deep-rooted. They are linked to tensions that have existed for decades between the largely Arab and Moslem north and the African and predominately Christian and animist south. (Despite these differences, the SPLA is not secessionist movement, and views itself as a Sudanese movement.) Under British colonial rule, the two regions, which share few traditions, were governed separately. The decision to unify the two regions was taken without adequate preparation, and without a clearly defined agreement about the future of political or economic relations. It is therefore not surprising that civil war broke out almost immediately after independence from Great Britain and Egypt in 1956. The civil war which began then has continued, except for a period of peace from 1972-1983, until today. Under the 1972 peace treaty concluded in Addis Ababa, the south was offered autonomy. However, the redivision of the south into three provinces, the government's reneging on regional autonomy agreements, economic factors, increased discrimination against the south, and the threatened imposition of Islamic law on the south led to the breakdown of the 1972 agreements. During 1983 and 1984 rebel groups formed in the south, primarily the SPLA. In 1985, the Nimeiri government was overturned and a transitional military council presided until elections were held in 1986 and a civilian government was established. (Elections did not take place in the south due, in part due to SPLA opposition.)

As Amnesty International noted in its July 1988 report on human rights developments in Sudan, the government of Prime Minister Sadiq Al Mahdi has abolished some of the laws which had permitted extensive abuses under the Nimeiri regime. The government abrogated the State Security Act, which permitted the holding of political detainees without trial, abolished the state security courts (which had imprisoned opponents of the government without fair trials) and ended the practice of administrative detention without trial under Section 97 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. (A State of Emergency declared on July 25, 1987 and renewed in January 1988 permits the authorities to detain people without charge or trial for an indefinite period. The State of Emergency also banned strikes and demonstrations and imposed the death penalty for sedition.) Amnesty International has also commended the government for abolishing the penalty of flogging for many offences, and noted that there have been no judicially-imposed amputations carried out since 1985 (though amputation sentences have continued to be imposed by the courts.)

Despite these welcome developments, persons continue to face punishment for the peaceful expression of their political views. In February 1988, for example, six Roman Catholic school teachers were accused of opening a church without permission and flogged with 25 lashes each. Islamic laws in force permit penalties of execution by stoning (which is reserved for adultery) and "execution and crucifixion." Amnesty International has stated that there have been cases before and after 1985 when these penalties were imposed but in no case have they been inflicted. Nonetheless, the State Department's 1988 Country Report on Human Rights notes that "Major General Abu Gurun, former Sudanese army commander in the southern garrison town of Wau, has been accused of inflicting atrocities against civilians, including food deprivation and crucifixions..." The Country Report goes on to note that Abu Gurun was promoted from the Wau command to leadership of the Military Academy, and that there had been no investigation of charges against him.

Another positive development which followed the fall of Nimeiri was the increase in freedom of speech and assembly. Many observers considered Sudan's press to be among the most free on the continent. Government critics within Sudan are generally able to promulgate their views in the press. The leader of the SPLA, John Garang, is quoted regularly. Nonetheless, increasing instability in the Sadiq government in recent months has resulted in the threat of press restriction. According to the London-based Index on Censorship, the government has adopted a hard-line stance on the press in mid-1988. In June, Prime Minister Al Mahdi called for new regulations to control the press, and accused the press of "fifth column" activities to undermine the country. In August, the Minister of Information criticized U.S. and British journalists for unfavorable reports from the south, and threatened to require journalists to register their equipment and declare their intentions before obtaining visas. Fortunately, the order was retracted almost immediately, though Index on Censorship reports that Western journalists continue to have difficulty obtaining travel documents.

In addition to the issues mentioned above, Human Rights Watch is deeply concerned about the following human rights problems in Sudan: gross abuses of human rights in the context of the civil war (including violations of the Geneva Conventions); use of starvation as a political weapon; the situation of the displaced; and the imposition of Islamic law.

1) Gross Abuses of Human Rights in the Context of the Civil War: In its war against the SPLA, the Sudanese government has employed grossly abusive measures in an effort to depopulate the south of civilians. This practice violates the laws of armed conflict (Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II, adopted in 1977.) Sudanese Catholic Archbishop Paolino Lukudu of the city of Juba, has accused the government of an "extermination program" against the south, and reported on a 1986 meeting between church leaders and Prime Minister Sadiq. According to the Archbishop, "The prime minister

himself told us if John Garang does not stop this war, the north will exterminate the south... This extermination program is what we see in the south -- displacement, hunger, insecurity, breakdown of social life." (The Christian Science Monitor, November 29, 1988.)

A key aspect of the government's counterinsurgency strategy against the SPLA has been to arm and encourage local militias in the south to destroy the SPLA's civilian base of support. The militias and other armed groups have committed atrocities against civilians belonging to ethnic groups that are regarded as sympathetic to or supportive of the SPLA, including mass killings, slavery, torture and other forms of ill-treatment. The Dinkas, the largest tribe in southern Sudan, with approximately three million people, have been the most frequent, though not the only, victims of abuses. Militia of the Fertit and Rizeigat tribes, both traditional ethnic rivals of the Dinkas, have killed and tortured many Dinkas. The Dinkas and other targeted groups have also been subjected to abuses as they attempt to flee the war zone, including the abduction of children, rape of women, and theft of cattle. On April 7, 1988, the General Secretariat of the Catholic Bishop's Conference released a news bulletin concerning human rights abuses carried out by militias. The report stated that the Arab militias were "armed, supported and served by the Army, with full approval from the Government and ... are absolutely unchecked, undisciplined and inspired by religious fanatics." The report described burning and looting of

Catholic churches, the torture and killing of catechists (which included such atrocities as disembowelment, crucifixion, and beheadings.) The church noted that "For honesty sake, we also have to acknowledge that some mosques and Imams were dealt with in a similar way by the SPLA rebels."

Other violations of the laws of war include the government's use of aerial bombardment against civilian targets. There have been reports of SPLA as well as government soldiers planting anti-personnel mines in areas of conflict which have victimized many civilians. (The Christian Science Monitor reported on November 29, 1989 that the SPLA's strategy "has been to drive village populations into government-held towns, leaving animals and unharvested crops behind. By laying ambushes and landmines, the rebels cut all access to food and supplies to the more than 200,000 residents and war refugees trapped in Juba.")

2) Starvation as a political weapon: Perhaps the greatest abuse in Sudan is the use of starvation as a military tactic by the government, and in some cases by insurgent forces. Both sides have sought to deprive their military opponents of civilian support by driving those civilians from contested areas through deprivation of food. This has created the largest internally-displaced population in the world, estimated at 2 to 3 million, and created a refugee population of 350,000 Sudanese in Ethiopia. Some 30,000 have sought refuge in Uganda.

The United Nations has estimated that as many as 500,000 civilians have died of starvation. While both the government and the SPLA rebel forces have deprived civilians of food, the government of Sadiq Al Mahdi bears the greater responsiblity for the tragedy, as the largest numbers of starving Sudanese are in government-held areas of the country, and the authorities have much greater access to food and the means to transport it. The military has regularly flown food into towns where people were starving in order to feed its own troops while it left civilians to die. A July 1988 AID background paper noted that the Khartoum government said it would not aid people in the south because it feared that food donations would be diverted by the SPLA for their own forces. Even worse, the government is intentionally denying American-supplied food and medicine to southern Sudanese, especially the Dinkas, on the mere suspicion that they are supporters of the SPLA. The government has expelled, arrested, and harassed relief workers, delayed food shipments or blocked shipments to particular towns. It has taken no action against local officials who have hoarded food meant for the starving to sell it later for barter on the local market. According to information provided to us by western church officials in Abyei, during 1987 and 1988 government officials permitted the use of foodgrains provided for relief assistance by the U.S. government used instead as fodder for cattle owned by Arabs in the area rather than distributed to the African Dinka people it was intended for. The government has also been accused of transporting weapons and other military supplies hidden in food trucks.

The SPLA has also been guilty of using food as a weapon, as you know. AID has noted that rebel forces said they attacked food convoys headed toward government-controlled towns because they could not distinguish between military and relief trucks. The rebels also vowed to continue to shoot down air shipments to towns controlled by the government unless relief is provided to an equal number of rebel-controlled towns. (Although no air shipments have been attacked by the rebels since 1987.)

The Sudanese authorities' attitude towards the starvation of its people may be seen in its response to an initiative by the United States to send a joint assessment team of private voluntary organizations and U.S. relief officials into the country to explore means of delivering emergency food aid to the south. Prime Minister Sadiq Al Mahdi denied official permission to the United States, insisting that aid not go forward in the south. (Nonetheless, as the Committee is aware, an assessment team visited the area and cross-border efforts to supply the south through Kenya were arranged and are now in operation.)

Heightened SPLA military activities in recent weeks around Torit and Juba, and the SPLA's call for civilians to leave Juba as a bombardment and siege of the city begin, are cause for alarm. While observers claim that there are few civilians left in Torit, by some estimates there are as many as 250,000 civilians in and around Juba. They are at grave risk from the shelling of Juba by the SPLA, which has already begun, and will be exceptionally vulnerable as they flee the city. Africa Watch calls upon the SPLA to comply with its obligations under the applicable Geneva Conventions, and take every precaution to protect civilians in the course of military operations. Indiscriminate shelling of areas with civilian populations clearly violates international law.

3) The Problem of the Displaced: As many as half of the south's population is now displaced, with the majority living around Khartoum and the others in other northern towns or SPLA-held areas in the south. (According to Roger Winter, Director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees, over 100,000 displaced people inhabit twenty-two feeding sites within SPLA-held zones in the south. The U.S. Committee for Refugees estimates that another 250,000 displaced civilians live around Juba and other government-controlled towns in the south. A third group lives in government-held areas in the transition zone between the north and south, and the largest group, some 1.5 million displaced southerners live in and around Khartoum.) Most of the displaced live in appalling conditions in shantytowns and camps, many of them constructed on top of garbage dumps. Food is scarce and disease is rampant. Malnutrition rates among displaced southerners living around Khartoum are as high as the rates of those in rural refugee camps. The government has shown absolutely no concern for their welfare. Under pressure from the inhabitants of Khartoum, the government has threatened to turn people out of urban areas into camps, or back to the south. In spite of their living conditions and its own failure to initiate

any programs of assistance, the government has done nothing to facilitate international humanitarian agencies to assist them. (For example, after the floods of August 1988, donors provided relief assistance through the government to aid displaced persons, but the displaced population in the south received little of it, due to systematic efforts by the authorities to deny assistance to the non-Islamic population.) Indeed, a number of the private voluntary organizations, including World Vision, who had aided the displaced have been expelled from the country.

4) Imposition of Islamic Laws on the South: The government's decision not to repeal the "September Laws" of September 1983, which triggered the current civil war, has played a significant role in the continuation of the war. These laws are based on Islamic law and include penalties of amputation of limbs for certain offenses. The issue has become even more sensitive since May 1988 when the Prime Minister included the National Islamic Front into the coalition government. The condition of the National Islamic Front's political support is an insistence on a form of Islamic law even more extreme than the "September Laws." The SPLA had rejected any form of Islamic law for the south, with or without exceptions for non-Muslims and has made its repeal a pre-condition of any peace talks. However, in August 1988 the SPLA adopted a more flexible position, and called for not a rollback of the law, but for a halt in its further implementation.

U.S. Policy: The U.S. has long been an important ally of Sudan, but in the past has failed to use its considerable leverage to press the government to improve its human rights practices and negotiate with the SPLA to end the civil war. Though executive branch officials have insisted otherwise, the Reagan Administration was very late in responding to the famine and displacement in the south for fear of offending Khartoum, and precious months were wasted while thousands died. The New York Times reported on February 17, 1989 that until last week's first food shipment from Kenya, "Washington had restricted its relief food to government-held towns for fear of affronting Sudan's government, a strategic ally."

The members and staff of these Committees, as well as members such as Representative Frank Wolf, who visited Sudan in January and met with Secretary Baker thereafter, have played an important role in the Administration's new direction. A number of development and refugee groups and recent Congressional visitors to Sudan have suggested policy directions for the United States in dealing with the enormous human misery in Sudan. Senators Edward Kennedy and Alan Simpson, for example, have called upon U.N. Secretary General Perez de Cuellar to appoint a special negotiator and humanitarian envoy to the Sudan, along the lines of the U.N. envoy to Afghanistan, to address the critical issues of civil war and famine relief. Congressman Wolf has called upon the Bush Administration to appoint a high-level "peace envoy" to negotiate a cease fire and open the roads to allow shipment of food and relief supplies throughout Sudan. The recent Congressional delegation from the Select Hunger Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee called for strong U.S. pressure on Khartoum to permit an immediate airlift to reach southern cities, to end military hoarding of food, to assist in transporting relief goods in government-controlled cities, to permit private voluntary organizations to operate without interference, and to protect relief operations in the south from abuse by militias.

As Congressman Ackerman's resolution indicates, Secretary Baker's February 8th statement and the cross-boarder feeding operation are indeed welcome developments. The February 8th statement, as you know, "calls upon the authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone." The statement went on to urge the SPLA and the Sudanese government to agree to an early ceasefire which would permit relief to reach those in need. Congressional and executive branch attention to Sudan is all the more important today, as conditions deteriorate. The Sudanese government has taken steps to restrict the influx of displaced people into Khartoum. According to informed sources in Khartoum, the army has installed roadblocks around the perimeter of the capital's three towns -- Khartoum, Khartoum North and Omdurman -- in an effort to control the movement of civilians.

As the situation in Khartoum deteriorates, the crisis in areas bordering the war-torn south continues to worsen. On March 1st The Sudan Times reported that the numbers of starving fleeing from the northern Dahr el Ghazal region have escalated in recent weeks, entering the town of Abyei in the neighboring area of southern Kordofan. The Sudanese Red Crescent was quoted as reporting that 14,000 people per day were currently entering the Abyei. While the figure quoted by the Red Crescent is considered inflated, the continued movement of large numbers of people out of what is considered a combat zone is not disputed. International relief efforts should not overlook Abyei, where local officials have not permitted distribution of food grains to civilians. (See above.) Army officials have discouraged refugees from remaining there. Thus for the most fortunate of the hungry, Abyei has become a transit point in their flight from famine. For those without cattle to sell to buy a journey north, Abyei is a place to die.

In his February 23, 1989 statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Deputy Assistant Secretary Kenneth L. Brown complained that the United States has been so critical of the Sadiq government that our influence today is limited. To quote Secretary Brown: "But our privileged access is beginning to show wear as a result of extensive public criticism of Sudan, our declining assistance levels and the repeated hard messages we have delivered to Khartoum." Africa Watch does not agree with Secretary Brown's suggestion that we lose influence when we speak out publicly on human rights. The enormity of the crisis today suggests that the United States' longstanding and extensive support for the Nimeiri Government (during which time the seeds of the present conflict were sown) and for the current regime has done little to mitigate gross abuses of human rights in Sudan. It was clear several years ago that Khartoum's abusive military tactics against the south were causing great suffering, forcing thousands to flee their homes, and paving the way for a famine of immense proportions. As Congressman Wolf noted in his report of his recent visit, skeletal refugees began arriving in Ethiopia in November 1987. I would note that the Select Committee on Hunger publicly called for a major diplomatic initiative to encourage dialogue, launch international relief operations in the south, and arrange a food truce agreement in 1986. And Chairman Wolpe and members and staff of the Africa Subcommittee were pressing the Administration years ago with respect to the human rights disaster developing in Sudan.

The Administration itself was certainly aware of serious human rights problems in Sudan several years ago. The State Department Country Reports for 1986 and 1987 describe extensive abuses by the government, including massacres by the militias and government interference with the provision of relief to the South. Yet I have seen no evidence that the executive branch used the leverage of U.S. aid, our votes in the multilateral lending institutions, or even public statements to pressure the Government of Sudan to change the policies which resulted in the death of half a million Sudanese by the end of 1988. It is hard not to agree with a recent editorial in The Atlanta Constitution, when it commended the Administration for "a real change of heart on Sudan policy" but concluded that "It's too bad it was so long in coming."

The press has recently reported that the United States Ambassador to Khartoum, G. Norman Anderson, has called for a resumption of U.S. military aid, informing a recent Congressional delegation visiting Sudan that "We can't succeed on charm alone..." (The Atlanta Constitution, December 21, 1988.) Africa Watch strongly disagrees. Our recommendations follow.

RECOMMENDATIONS: The U.S. should bring every possible pressure to bear on the Sadiq government. We urge the Congress to insist that bilateral aid (except for humanitarian assistance) be strictly conditioned on human rights improvements. Furthermore, the Administration should take the following steps:

1. The executive branch should insist that immediate action be taken to disarm the militias, and to protect civilians in areas of militia strength. The Sudanese Government is responsible for abuses committed by the militias which it armed.

2. The authorities must end their interference in the provision of emergency food aid, including their restrictive licensing and registration operations which have hampered the operations of private voluntary organizations. Private voluntary organizations which have been expelled from Sudan should be permitted to return.

3. The government in Khartoum must be pressed to negotiate a humanitarian cease fire for purposes of delivering emergency aid throughout the country, and permit the opening of roads and waterways to the delivery of food and supplies.

4. Furthermore, in view of ample evidence that the Sudanese military is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, the United States should suspend licenses for

the commercial sale of military supplies. In 1988, an estimated $4.984 million worth of military items were licenses for sale to Sudan, and fiscal year 1989 deliveries are estimated at $1.093 million. Section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits commercial sales of military items to countries engaged in gross violations of human rights. Such sales to Sudan should be suspended.

5. The United States can and should use its influence in the international development banks to encourage human rights improvements in Sudan, in accordance with Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act. In 1988, Sudan received $139.7 in World Bank loans, supported by the United States. The World Bank has imposed a series of economic conditions upon future activities in the Sudan, but the United States should condition its support for loans (and urge our allies to do the same) upon a negotiated end to the conflict and respect for human rights.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF KENNETH L. BROWN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR AFRICA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to appear before this Committee and this Subcommittee to discuss the current political climate in Sudan and developments related to peace. I would like to briefly outline U.S. interests in Sudan, the history of peace initiatives and what we have done to promote peace, and assess where peace prospects stand now. Mrs. Taft will then discuss the status of relief efforts. We will do our best to answer any questions you might have.

Peace has been our main objective in Sudan for a number of years. It is a prerequisite to dealing effectively with Sudan's most critical problems: ending human suffering and rehabilitating the economy. An estimated one to two million Sudanese have been displaced by the civil war. Many of these continue to be at risk of starvation -- estimates of Sudanese deaths from starvation in 1988 alone range into the hundreds of thousands. Peace would also reduce the number of human rights violations; most are related to the war.

It is also clear that efforts at sustained economic rehabilitation will be futile until peace is restored. The Sudanese Government estimates the war directly costs it about $1 million a day. That does not include costs of relief efforts and services to the displaced population -- which numbers at least 1 million just in the Khartoum area -- or the cost of disruption of essential commodities, especially fuel, which are sporadically commandeered for the war effort. The war also prevents all but the most basic economic activity in the South, including completion of the Junglei Canal and the development of Chevron's oil field. In short, until the war ends, Sudan has no prospect of working toward a better economic future. With peace, in view of Sudan's agricultural potential and its highly developed human resource base, that future could still be realized.

Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordered by nine countries in a region plagued with instability. It can influence the region's stability either in a positive or a negative sense. Not only Sudan would benefit from its political and economic stability; so would our other friends in the region such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Kenya. Continuation of current turmoil and war works to polarize Africa along racial and religious lines and serves the interests of adversaries of the U.S.

We support democracy in Sudan. But democracies can lack resolution and direction; Prime Minister Sadiq has just formed his third coalition since May 1987 and there is much divisiveness and maneuvering among the political parties in Khartoum. Hard decisions, including those related to peace, are often sidetracked. Nonetheless Sudan's democratic institutions deserve our support -- even if we do not agree with all of the government's policies and decisions.

Given the massive level of human suffering and inability to move forward on critical issues, Sudan was the focal point of high-level attention in the last administration and will certainly remain so now. President Bush has visited Sudan twice, the last time as Vice President in 1985, and met in

Washington with senior Sudanese officials on nine occasions in his vice-Presidential capacity, including a meeting with Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi in 1986, a few months after Sadiq was elected. Secretary Shultz met with Sadiq in 1986 and with then Foreign Minister Abu Salih last October. Assistant Secretary Crocker has visited Sudan since Sadiq became Prime Minister and on numerous occasions has engaged in extensive conversations with senior Sudanese officials visiting Washington. I have visited the Horn three times in the past 14 months, meeting with senior officials of both the Sudanese Government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA -- the insurgent force.)

Sudan's high priority has been affirmed by the new Administration. As you are aware, on February 8 the Secretary issued a statement calling for an early ceasefire in Sudan and a background paper on prospects for peace and relief there. As before, we are attempting to promote peace and relief through a combination of private and public diplomacy. The Secretary's statement is the third public appeal we have made regarding Sudan since October.

Given the level of our attention to Sudan, obvious questions arise: what have we been doing to promote peace? Why haven't there been more results? What are the prospects for peace?

Let me briefly review the origin of the war and peace efforts to date. This civil war is the second since Sudan's independence in 1956. The first, which was also fought between

Northern and Southern Sudanese over essentially the same issues of political and economic powersharing, national identity and religion, lasted from independence until 1972. The current conflict started in 1983 when then President Nimeiri attempted to diversify -- critics say dilute -- the political power of Southern Sudanese by dividing the South -- then one province -- into three provinces. He also instituted an Islamic legal code ("shari'a"), known as the 1983 September Laws, which was strongly opposed by Southerners as well as many Northern Sudanese. Nimeiri was ousted in April 1985 by a military government, the Transitional Military Command, or TMC, which promised to replace the September Laws with the previously existing secular legal code and to restore democracy. Democracy was restored with Sadiq's election a year later but the TMC never revoked the September Laws, nor have any of the subsequent governments under Sadiq.

Efforts to end the civil war began in earnest under the TMC in March 1986, just before Sadiq was elected. Months of negotiation between an alliance of Sudanese political parties and the SPLA resulted in the Koka Dam agreement which established the blueprint for a peace process. The agreement called for (1) the abrogation of the September Laws, (2) an end to the state of emergency imposed by the TMC, (3) holding a constitutional conference, (4) adoption of the 1956 constitution as amended through 1974 (the previous secular constitution), (5) abrogation of foreign military agreements and (6) continuous efforts by both sides to work toward peace.

The agreement was signed by the SPLA and by a number of political parties including Sadiq's Umma Party. But critically absent were representatives of the National Islamic Front (NIF) -- the Islamic Fundamentalists -- and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) -- Sudan's second largest party.

The Koka Dam agreement was heralded by both sides but became a dead letter. The Government established a Ministry of Peace in August 1986 with a mandate to find a solution to the war and organize a conference for a new constitution. The Ministry developed a large staff but failed to accomplish anything of substance before its dissolution late in 1988.

The U.S. has been active in trying to bring Khartoum and the SPLA to the negotiating table. We are willing to do more depending on the wishes of the two sides. There have been many other mediation attempts. Mediators and would-be mediators have included President Museveni of Uganda, President Mubarak of Egypt, Chairman Mengistu of Ethiopia, former Nigerian President Obasanjo working with Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Francis Deng and even Colonel Qadhafi. In addition, Sudanese political parties and military figures have met with the SPLA informally to seek solutions. Even members of the present government in Khartoum have talked with the SPLA.

Some of the various initiatives have led to promising openings; most have been mishandled by one side or both. The SPLA has consistently failed to coordinate its military activity with peace initiatives. For example, in August 1986 shortly following promising discussions between Khartoum and the SPLA, the SPLA shot down a relief plane. Khartoum responded by cutting off contacts with the SPLA for a number of months. In November 1987, a Sadiq-Garang meeting was cancelled when the SPLA, with Ethiopian help, attacked and overran a Sudanese border town a week before the scheduled summit.

The Sudanese Government has also missed or avoided opportunities. It abandoned promising discussions between the Sudanese military and SPLA in November 1987. In 1988 the Government showed little interest in testing Garang's sincerity after he announced willingness in March to meet "unconditionally" with Sadiq. In contrast, it was quick to accept a U.S.-brokered summit meeting between Sadiq and Garang later in the year, only to see Garang fail to pursue that opportunity. Most recently, since last November, the Government has not vigorously pursued a promising ceasefire framework negotiated by the DUP and SPLA.

Despite the failures, there has been much positive movement over the past year or so. Khartoum has focussed more clearly on addressing Southern problems as the primary peace track. Over the past year much stronger lines of communication and understanding have been established between Khartoum and the SPLA; official emissaries have talked and are talking in a substantial way. Both sides also now focus more directly on the key issues which need resolution. The critical issues were distilled into the DUP/SPLA agreement: (1) suspending efforts to pass a new shari'a law code prior to a constitutional conference, (2) Khartoum's abrogation of military agreements with other countries (at SPLA's insistence), (3) lifting the State of Emergency Laws and implementing a ceasefire and, most importantly, (4) holding a constitutional conference.

This stepped-up level of contact and more concentrated focus on the issues does not necessarily portend a quick breakthrough. Despite the dialogue, both sides continue to harbor deep suspicions. The SPLA does not believe the coalition in Khartoum is seriously interested in a peace formula which would permit the SPLA's political survival or that any compromise to which the South assents would be honored by the present government. The SPLA is thus working for a change, hoping chances for negotiation would be better under a successor government. The Government, for its part, sees the SPLA as less interested in peace than in pressing its military options on the ground, with Ethiopian support.

There is indeed an Ethiopian linkage to the war; while Ethiopia is not the key to peace in Southern Sudan, it is certainly a factor. Strong SPLA dependence on Ethiopia for arms and sanctuary, including recruiting in Sudanese refugee camps, gives Ethiopia considerable influence with the SPLA. During the past year, the Sudanese and Ethiopians have made intermittent efforts to act as mediators for each other with their respective insurgencies. These efforts are currently stalled.

In this checkered history of peace initiatives the United States stand has been clear.

We strongly believe a political solution needs to be found. Neither side will achieve a military victory. The warring parties themselves are in agreement on this, at least to the extent of their public statements.

We believe that the root causes of the war -- economic and political powersharing, national identity and Islamic law -- must be resolved by the Sudanese themselves. The conflict is internal and a solution imposed from outside cannot be expected to succeed. We recognize that the South has legitimate grievances which must be addressed and we have said so to both sides. Since the resolution is internal, we have not taken any positions on the merits of the issues which must be resolved. This includes the emotional issue of Islamic law; we consider the choice of a legal system to be a matter of national sovereignty.

But we have taken strong positions on some of the threshold aspects of a peace process and have continually pressed both sides hard. We support an early ceasefire and the postponement of action on the new shari'a law code until the issue can be decided at a constitutional conference. We have pressed both sides to be bolder, taking some risks and displaying greater statesmanship in the quest for peace. We have offered our operational help in the peace process in any any appropriate role acceptable to both sides.

We have also had discussions with the Soviets on the Horn of Africa and reviewed various roles that they and their friends in Addis Ababa could play in support of a Sudanese peace settlement. Ethiopia should desist from the role of spoiler in the use of its influence with the SPLA.

Finally, we need to consider the tools we have available to pursue our objectives. Any effective leverage we have in promoting relief and peace applies only to Khartoum. We meet with the SPLA but have little or no leverage with them. We have virtually no influence with Ethiopia but have suggested the Soviets use theirs. The Soviets have said they would do so but the results are not yet apparent.

Our influence on the Sudanese Government relies more on our traditional friendship and Sudan's commitment to democracy than on leverage provided by U.S. aid. During three coalitions we have had unrestricted access to the highest levels of the Sudanese Government. This has allowed frank and frequent discussions at the top. But our privileged access is beginning to show wear as a result of extensive public criticism of Sudan, our declining assistance levels and the repeated hard messages we have delivered to Khartoum.

At this point, the Sudanese may well regard our assistance levels as a barometer of our friendship. Those levels have declined steadily from 1985 when we provided $269 million in program assistance to Sudan to the FY 88 level of $73 million and FY 89 level of $64 million. As a practical matter, this does not represent strong economic influence since we are unable to deliver much of the available assistance. Because Sudan is more than a year behind in debt obligations to the USG, our disbursement of our economic and military assistance to Sudan is currently blocked by legislation. Also, the prospect for new PL-480 Title I programs is complicated by the fact that Sudan is $15 million in arrears on old PL-480 payments. We are not sanguine that Sudan has the means to clear these arrearages this fiscal year. It must pay a total of $78 million to the U.S. this year to keep U.S. program assistance flowing.

We were most attentive and guardedly optimistic in November when the DUP and SPLA agreed to a ceasefire blueprint; it showed the needed flexibility by both sides on all issues -- even Islamic law -- and we strongly supported that initiative. It was the most significant step forward since Koka Dam in 1986. We were greatly disappointed when the Government did not follow through vigorously. We hope that the current coalition, now without the DUP, will quickly follow up on its announced commitment to produce a new peace initiative. We have no indication of what its form might be, the issues addressed in the DUP/SPLA agreement are certainly those which should be discussed.

The success of both sides on relief in recent months is somewhat better than on peace. The U.S. has done much to help existing relief efforts take hold and establish additional operations. This includes our sustained efforts to promote the the ICRC program to provide relief to those in need on both sides of war zone. Our policy is to provide relief wherever it is needed. The Embassy and AID mission in Khartoum spend well over half their time on relief-related issues. Mrs. Taft will now discuss relief.

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JULIA VADALA TAFT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN DISASTER ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman and committee members, I am pleased to appear before the Committee today to update you on the situation in southern Sudan, and the United States Government's role in the international relief programs currently under way in that region.

From a humanitarian standpoint the situation today in southern Sudan is appalling. Years of intense fighting have devastated the region. Today over two million survivors are at risk. Many continue to die because of the tragic civil war which afflicts Sudan.

Unfortunately, there continue to be substantial obstacles to providing help on a timely basis. The United States, in concert with the rest of the international donor community, continues to try to provide relief assistance to the region and continues to press hard on both warring sides to provide better access to the innocent, non-combatant civilian populations caught in the cross-fire of the war.

Since February 1988, the United States has committed over $60 million in relief assistance to meet the urgent and humanitarian requirements of the south and for war-displaced southerners. The problem is not a lack of food or other resources. The problem is the fighting which prevents us from getting the food to the people.

There can be no doubt that the survival of these innocent millions trapped in southern Sudan will continue to be in grave danger until the fighting stops. It is just as clear there can be no long term progress of any sort in the region until peace reigns. It is essential, therefore, that a cessation of hostilities be achieved so that adequate relief can be provided to the many people at risk.

* *

The emergency humanitarian relief objectives of this Administration, and its predecessors, have been consistent:

-- to identify people at risk of famine and other life-threatening situations, wherever these people may be;

-- to understand what assistance the host country or indigenous relief organizations will provide, and then, in concert with the other donors, respond in an appropriate fashion;

-- to monitor and evaluate as much as possible the distribution of our assistance during and after implementation of the programs; and

-- to deal successfully with the bottlenecks that arise so often during implementation of all relief programs.

On February 7th, the Secretary of State said:

> "We call on authorities at all levels on both sides to remove remaining obstacles and do everything possible to provide emergency relief to victims caught in garrison towns and other areas of the war zone. Failure to do so will mean that thousands more will die in the coming rainy season. The United States will do all it can to support this effort. We call on other donors also to undertake or expand relief efforts."

The Secretary concluded his statement by saying:

> "As friends of Sudan we urge the Sudanese Government and the SPLA to put peace first and to agree to an early ceasefire which would promote that goal and allow relief to reach those in need."

* *

The U.S. has been carrying out emergency food relief programs in Sudan for the past five years, with our efforts more and more targetted towards southern Sudanese. Since 1986, the war in southern Sudan has increasingly disrupted life in the South. It has forced over a million people to flee for their lives. Over three hundred thousand trekked to asylum in Ethiopian refugee camps. More than a million others made their way towards Khartoum in search of shelter, food and a safe haven. Over two million remain entrapped in the south. Many of these individuals are completely dependent on relief for survival.

The greatest constraints to providing relief to the people in the south have always been logistics and the threats posed to relief efforts by the combatants. Both sides in the war (the Government of Sudan and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army - SPLA) need to cooperate to facilitate emergency relief.

In 1984, when the U.S. first began to provide large amounts of emergency relief to Sudanese and refugees, the great size of the country, long distances and rudimentary infrastructure were major constraints in delivering relief. Substantial efforts were undertaken by all donors to improve Sudan's railway and truck fleets and to improve storage and distribution. Even in areas where the Government has full access, there were substantial delays and, ultimately, use of airlift was required to ensure food was available to people at risk on a timely basis. In 1985, for example, A.I.D. carried out an extremely effective but quite expensive emergency relief program via helicopter in western Sudan. A.I.D. also used land trains across the desert, camel caravans, barge convoys and unit trains to improve delivery of emergency relief within the country. These efforts were successful and widespread famine problems were generally avoided.

As the food shortages and famine threat in the north and east receded, however, the war in the south escalated and the human problems associated with the war began to increase and become more noticeable. In coordination with the Government and the donor community, A.I.D. planned similarly comprehensive relief efforts to the south. Unfortunately, during the last several years these efforts have faced insurmountable obstacles. Not enough could be done. Nonetheless, efforts continued, as possible, and progress has been made, especially during this dry season.

Donors gained Government permission to undertake relief programs in the south and the Government's policy was generally favorable towards relief programs. Field implementation was not always up to expectations or as forthcoming as official Government policy. It was often difficult to move emergency assistance into rural areas. The Sudanese transportation and governmental infrastructure is weak, especially in the South. Commands from Khartoum were often not implemented or only partially implemented after extraordinary efforts by the donors. Consistent donor dialogue with the Government highlighted implementation issues but the dialogue was time consuming and directed at the center. Persistent economic and political turmoil further frustrated the institutional capacity of Government counterparts.

Moreover, both Government and SPLA forces have been suspicious of efforts in rural areas. Both sides believed that independent organizations might use relief assets to support the military objectives of their adversaries. A war was under way and relief convoys and planes were shot at or downed regularly. Operation Rainbow, an ill-fated United Nations sponsored airlift to the south, was terminated in 1986 after one of its planes was shot down by the SPLA. As a consequence of these and other incidents, relief programs concentrated in

Government-held towns such as Juba and Wau, with minimal penetration into rural areas. And programs to those towns became more and more constricted.

In early 1986, in addition to our direct, bilateral U.S. emergency relief assistance, A.I.D. was also supporting other donors' programs in the south through organizations such as Band Aid, the World Food Program and World Vision.

In the Spring of 1986, as the situation in the south became more aggravated and relief efforts more problematic, the U.S. Government became increasingly concerned about reports of suffering. A variety of responses were attempted to enlarge the diameter of the pipeline to the south. Representatives of A.I.D. talked with representatives of all sides fighting in the south to determine what type of additional assistance could be delivered into the region. As a result of the talks, A.I.D. tried - unsuccessfully - to find a cooperating sponsor willing to work in areas that had not previously been reached in southern Sudan.

At the same time, A.I.D. adopted a strategy of trying continually to provide food relief into the south by positioning relief "around" the south (in northern Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and through Zaire), and delivering it when and if it was possible.

In order to carry out these programs, the United States concluded a series of grain swaps in 1987 for 32,000 MT of food - with the Governments of Kenya and Sudan. Other donors made efforts to purchase local food in Uganda. These stocks supplemented earlier large stocks which the A.I.D. mission had stored from the drought emergency relief efforts of 1985.

During 1986 and early 1987, groups like Church World Service and Lutheran World Relief delivered several thousand tons of emergency relief supplies funded by the U.S. from Kenya and Uganda, and through Zaire, into southwestern Sudan. Other groups such as the World Food Program airlifted food into southern Sudan from Khartoum and Kosti, in the north. Overall, the objective had been to preposition about 70,000 MT in the south. Finally, these efforts collectively moved less than half that amount in the 1987 dry season. Some commercial grain was also going into the south.

Barge convoys ran the gauntlet up the Nile, from Kosti to Renk and Malakal. Relief trains made their way - very slowly - to Aweil. And truck convoys went from Kenya to Uganda and then tried to make it through the war into the towns of Juba and Torit. Food was also airlifted into the south from Kenya and Uganda. While these programs were somewhat successful, they reached only a limited number of the people trapped in the war and, as previously, generally only people in areas controlled by the Government. By the end of 1987 it was clear that the situation of the population had reached an awful state. Fewer supplies were getting in through relief or commercial channels. Local production was minimized because of the fighting. Reports of civilian deaths began to mount. With the donors, A.I.D. worked to keep relief supplies moving to the extent possible. Obstacles to such efforts grew.

Emblematic of such obstacles is the fate of those who have risked their lives to move supplies to the south. Sadly, the lives of many relief workers have been lost in these efforts. Convoys were attacked on a regular basis, and trucks savaged and drivers killed. In several incidents in Uganda truck drivers were murdered. In other incidents trucks have been destroyed by mines or hijacked. Pilferage by roaming bands of guerrillas and bandits are common in southern Sudan. In early 1988 a barge convoy to Malakal was attacked several times. A few barges were sunk and about a dozen guards were killed. Trains have faced similar troubles. Track has been removed and bridges have been demolished. Roads too have been destroyed. As the insecurity spread, relief operations in several towns were halted. MSF/France (Doctors Without Borders) had to halt operations in Aweil in 1986. The International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) suspended its operations in 1986. Other international organizations like the World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO) were forced to leave unsettled areas like Wau by the Government.

Food was diverted, stolen and otherwise never reached the people for whom it was intended. In 1987, for example, about four thousand tons of food destined for Wau was "lost" in Raga under unclear circumstances. Other allegations have been made, but the security situation in the south makes effective monitoring of relief supplies impossible.

Ultimately, because of the inability to provide relief to people where they needed it, millions began to flee the south. They too faced unimaginable horrors in their March out. No one knows how many died en route from of the fighting. This exodus created new problems, since few Sudanese villages and towns were prepared for an influx of nomadic pastoralists from the south. Displaced peoples congregated wherever they thought relief would be forthcoming and created severe stress on the functioning of the rural economies in southern Darfur and Kordofan. Several hundred thousand young men and boys made a longer, more arduous trek to Western Ethiopia, where they became refugees - creating additional emergency problems in that country.

While non-governmental organizations began relief programs for the displaced peoples in the rural areas, the plight of the displaced peoples who eventually survived and straggled into Khartoum was yet another major and unpleasant problem for a Government struggling with a multitude of other major and pressing problems. Only a minimal amount of assistance was provided by donor agencies who, quite naturally, concentrated their efforts on trying to reach those worse off and still in the south.

In 1987 and 1988, because of mounting concern over the situation and the inability to get supplies to the south, the U.S. (principally) began urging the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to re-mount a program, delivering relief supplies to both sides of the war zone. It was hoped that this effort might ensure an even-handed approach to the increasingly difficult problem of supplying relief to peoples in a war zone. This program had a very long gestation period because of the suspicions both sides harbored about each other and the ICRC. The program finally got under way in December 1988 and has delivered some relief but by no means what it could if it were supported by both sides in the way it should be. The program was suspended due to SPLA non concurrence during the week of February 13th. Flights resumed on February 22.

As noted above, by the end of 1987, the U.S., which had been monitoring the situation continually and searching for ways to increase the flow of relief supplies into the region, continued to talk frankly with the Government about the problems and its responsibilities in the region. The U.S. continued to seek more and better quality Government of Sudan support for relief efforts in the south, as well as improved support for programs to aid the displaced peoples in the north.

The Government of Sudan, as a result, focused more effort on the problems of the displaced populations and those still left in the south. But more needed to be done. A number of tracks were followed.

In June 1988, the Prime Minister asked the United Nations to alert the donor community to the grave situation of the displaced peoples in Sudan. The United Nations sent in a high level team in early summer 1988. The team's visit was followed by devastating floods in Khartoum and other northern cities, which had severe impact on the displaced peoples. After reviewing the effects of the devastating floods of August 1988, and further discussions with the Government to ensure there was an agreed upon Government policy on displaced peoples, the United Nations issued a $70 million appeal for emergency assistance for the displaced people in the north and those still at risk in the south.

By late summer 1988, it was clear that these and other efforts were not having a quick enough effect. The 1988 dry season effort had failed to preposition sufficient amounts of food in the south. The refugee flows to Ethiopia in late 1987 and the surge of displaced persons during the summer underlined the need to act quickly. Again information about the situation was sparse.

More evidence of the full horror of the suffering became apparent late in the summer as reports of the situation at Abyei came to light. Abyei is a small town located on the edge of the south in Southern Khordofan. During the summer of 1988 thousands of displaced people arrived in Abyei. They were in pitiful condition; sick, tired and hungry.

Abyei itself is inaccessible during the rainy season. There was little food in the town and there were no facilities for shelter. A few PVOs were present and they made heroic efforts to help. Daily death rates were very high. Supplies were inadequate. Resupply was slow and communication to Khartoum was infrequent. When word of the situation reached Khartoum the donors were galvanized to act unilaterally.

The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance quickly mounted a large-scale relief operation. Through the efforts of OFDA an emergency airlift was put in motion which was able to resupply the town with food and medical supplies. This effort has continued into the dry season and has been complemented by overland transport of food. Efforts are under way to ensure that sufficient food is in place for the next dry season.

The attention on Abyei represented a tremendous step forward. In response to world concern over Abyei, the Government took a more forthcoming position on assistance. Likewise, many suspect that heightened public attention on the suffering in Sudan swayed the SPLA to finally allow the ICRC operation to start. Other donors joined the United States in undertaking enhanced efforts to move more food to the south. Other promising things began to happen including serious talk of peace in December. For a time there was momentum for relief.

Since Abyei, other extraordinary efforts have been mounted. Unfortunately, while progress has been made, the size of the need far exceeds the donor's ability to deliver and the political climate has deteriorated. Security, transport infrastructure and nature constrain operations. A gruesome example of this reality is the situation at the besieged town of Aweil. Relief workers finally got into Aweil last fall. No food had been delivered to Aweil since early in 1988. The workers discovered that 8,000 had died of starvation at Aweil during the summer. Immediate efforts were made to initiate an airlift to Aweil to provide food. Food is now moving and the suffering has been abated. But, it is estimated that the donors need to get over 5,000 MT of food into Aweil before the next rains to feed those still alive. The small airstrip at Aweil and lack of regular overland access make this a hard target to achieve.

Aweil is but one town. There are several others in the south in the same situation. Without peace or a more forthcoming attitude from all concerned, it will be impossible to meet these urgent humanitarian needs.

Since the fall, the U.S. has provided almost $5 million of non-food emergency relief. Some of this money - $1.5 million - was granted to the Government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) - for airlift, truck and train deliveries to Aweil, airlift to other locations and for vehicles for the RRC.

The U.S. has also provided over $3 million of assistance for a variety of other activities carried out by numerous organizations. These activities have included marine radios and tugboats to improve barge delivery of supplies to Malakal, money to UNICEF for drugs, medical supplies and water supply, money to Catholic Relief Services for airlifting of food to Juba, airlifting parachutes for an airdrop of supplies into Torit, and further airlifts in southern Sudan.

A.I.D. also supports other attempts to augment relief into southern Sudan from neighboring countries. As stated previously, we had tried to develop such activities in 1986, to no avail. Now the U.S. has intensified its efforts to develop a viable way to provide relief throughout the South.

While one of the major problems with providing assistance into rural areas of southern Sudan in the past has been total lack of information about conditions, now some (hopefully) reliable information is being generated. Coupled with the prior track records of the organizations requesting assistance, and with a better logistical network, there is a better chance to deliver assistance into formerly unreachable areas of southern Sudan.

The basic thrust of U.S. Government emergency relief policy and strategy towards southern Sudan now is two-fold:

-- wherever possible for the U.S. and other donors to continue to provide as much emergency relief as possible and practical, given the constraints, and

-- wherever possible to pre-position and stockpile as much as practical before the rainy season comes in earnest in several months time.

-- whenever possible to pressure officials of GOS and SPLA to expand their own relief responsibilites.

In summation, the human suffering in southern Sudan is extensive and pervasive. If we, the other donors and the warring parties cannot provide humanitarian, emergency relief assistance now, conditions will only get worse in the future and more people will die needlessly.

A.I.D. is prepared to provide whatever assistance is possible and appropriate, within available resources, to the region to reduce human suffering. Unfortunately, as Secretary Baker said,

> "The sad reality, however, is that starvation will almost certainly not end until the fighting ends."

Our efforts will, at best, be only partially effective until the Government of Sudan and the SPLA stop their fighting and peace returns to the region. When that happens, or when there is an effective ceasefire in the south, then, and only then, will the donors and other relief organizations be able to identify and deliver adequate and appropriate amounts of emergency assistance to the many suffering people of southern Sudan.

It is possible the upcoming meeting called by the United Nations, in Khartoum in early March, will help achieve this objective. A.I.D., of course, will participate in the meeting.

All people of compassion and peace are optimistic the fighting will soon cease. It is only then that the many innocent victims of this war, the ones we and so many others grieve over and try so hard to help, will be truly accessible, safe and at peace.

[redacted] [redacted] - SUDAN



PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN PRENDERGAST, POLICY ANALYST, CENTER OF CONCERN/ COALITION FOR PEACE IN THE HORN OF AFRICA BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, FEBRUARY 23, 1989

U.S. POLICY IN SUDAN

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you all for allowing public testimony as part of this hearing on U.S. policy in Sudan. My name is John Prendergast. I am a policy analyst with the Center of Concern here in Washington, and I have recently returned from a five week fact-finding mission throughout rebel and government held territory in Sudan. I am also co-coordinator of the newly-formed Coalition for Peace in the Horn of Africa, an association of about 60 U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations which have pledged to work on U.S. policy issues in Sudan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. The formation of the Coalition is a reflection of the growing concern on the part of many that the root causes of the crises facing the peoples of the Horn must begin to be addressed by U.S. policy, and that band-aids are no longer sufficient to salve the conscience of the U.S. public.

By not openly and strongly challenging the racially, religiously, and economically discriminatory policies of their client in Khartoum, the previous U.S. Administration and multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and United Nations' donor agencies unfortunately must be considered silent accessories to the systematic depopulation of vast areas of southern Sudan. But the latest egregious abuses perpetrated by the Sudanese government against civilians in the South are merely symptomatic of a radicalized leadership bent on centralizing control of all economic, religious, and political decision-making in the country.

To his credit, Secretary of State James Baker has quickly abandoned the quiet diplomacy of his predecessor, authorized the shipment of food into rebel-held areas of southern Sudan, and identified peace as the number one priority of U.S. policy in Sudan.

These hopeful signs, however, are effectively neutralized by the U.S. government's hesitation on taking the bold steps necessary to create the conditions for peace.

First, a State Department White Paper issued two weeks ago repeats a fundamental misconception upon which U.S. policy has been based. "The scale of the suffering is so large," the Paper states, "that causes of the war and goals of the combatants have become of secondary importance" to ending the conflict. The problem with this is that these 'causes' and 'goals' have been of 'secondary importance' to the U.S. and Sudanese governments all along. Peace cannot come and the suffering cannot be alleviated until these deeply felt grievances begin to be addressed not only inside Sudan but by donors supporting the Sudanese government as well.

Secondly, the Bush Administration is in the process of developing its request for aid for Sudan for the coming fiscal year. More aid will not purchase more leverage at this point. A cease-fire could be achieved tomorrow in Sudan's civil war if international donors, led by the U.S., froze all aid (except emergency food and medicine) and conditioned its resumption of the achievement of peace within the country.

It is clearly in the long-term interest of multilateral donors and governments allied with the Sudan to sanction the Sudanese government for its unwillingness to sign the peace agreement negotiated by the insurgent Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the second largest political party in the country. In the absence of peace, debts cannot begin to be repaid, minerals cannot be extracted, people cannot feed themselves, and a stable government and economic system cannot be maintained.

A series of myths currently guiding U.S. policy in Sudan will be addressed in the following testimony. In the pursuit of peace in Sudan, it is critical that we understand the fundamental causes of the ongoing conflict, that we examine who and what are obstacles to its resolution, and that we develop an alternative U.S. policy which would be most supportive of the difficult process of peace and unification.

MYTH # 1: THE ISSUE OF ISLAMIC LAW IS THE PRIMARY CAUSE OF WAR

It is a widely held misconception that the imposition of Islamic Law in 1983 was the primary ignitive factor leading to the current conflict. In actuality, the series of mutinies in southern garrisons were the expression of years of increasing political and economic marginalization of all non-Muslim Africans inside the country, culminating in the division of the South by the central government into three new provinces, and the recentralization of most decision-making back to Khartoum.

The twin desires for localized control of resources and decentralized decision-making have been at the heart of every liberation movement in the Sudan since Independence. Despite the elaborate plans for exploitative "development" concocted for southern Sudan by multinationals, the U.S. Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), multilateral donor institutions, and elites in Khartoum, the lesson should have been learned over and over again by now that disenfranchised southern Sudanese are not weak peasants who will lie down and accept forcibly imposed economic and political schemes which serve to rape local resources and deprive people of the ability to determine their own development.

The diversity of cultures and aspirations of different segments of the Sudan's population makes complete authority concentrated in central government hands unsustainable and unacceptable to those on the periphery. As former Sudanese Foreign Minister Francis Deng has written, the "resistance to assimilation increases in direct proportion to the level of coercion applied" by the central government. Indeed, many of the negative connotations of 'tribalism' are directly resultant from colonial and post-colonial centralism. The arrogant processes of centralization would not have been and would not continue to be possible without massive, unquestioning assistance from the U.S. and other benefactors.

In summary, the imposition of Islamic Law in 1983 was and is not the primary cause of war. There are deep-seated political, economic, and cultural problems that must be addressed if our pursuit of peace is to be effective.

MYTH # 2: U.S. AND MULTILATERAL ASSISTANCE IS HELPING THE PEOPLE OF SUDAN

The voluminous amount of foreign aid that continues to flow to the government of Sudan does nothing but reinforce the structural and social inequities which produce conflict and disempower the masses, which in turn leads to the increasing incidence of famine and instability. With all the conditions attached to their aid, A.I.D. and the World Bank have never vigorously pursued the equitable spreading of resources to, or local decision-making by, the South or other regions not favored by the central government. Nor have they consistently provided the types of aid that increase food self-sufficiency at the household and village levels. Uninterrupted external assistance as it is currently given from the West and from Arab governments strengthens Prime Minister Sadiq el Mahdi in his resolve to avoid a meaningful settlement of the conflict in Sudan.

The Sudanese government is currently spending an estimated $1 million a day on the war, a level which clearly could not be sustained with foreign exchange earned by exporting cotton, livestock, and sesame. The U.S., Middle Eastern, and European governments have provided the means to continue the conflict well past the stage where a self-supporting government would have had to negotiate solutions or crumble under the weight of broad-based opposition.

The current leadership in Sudan needs Western investment capital and aid to keep its artificial economy and privileged status intact. Whenever the flow of that capital has seemed endangered, former President Nimieri and current Prime Minister el Mahdi have cunningly used the Libyan alternative and the Soviet threat to keep the U.S. credit line flowing. The U.S government has been and continues to be bluffed and strung along by successive Sudanese governments invoking the specter of communist encroachment.

Astute analysts of the 1984-85 famine in Sudan attribute government policy which allowed large landowners and foreign-owned agribusiness to take over land previously tilled by smallholders as one of the primary reasons for the huge number of deaths by starvation. Massive amounts of money have been given in the interests of increased production to assist these mechanized ventures, as well as to the Gezeira cotton schemes, one of the government's main sources of income and a major base of support for el Mahdi. This type of aid looks good on paper because it leads to increased aggregate output and foreign exchange, but it clearly reinforces the economic domination of central government and agribusiness elites and the impoverishment of those marginalized in the process.

A quick word about the multilateral institutions....

The Sudan is currently over $800 million in arrears to the IMF and its total external debt is over $12 billion. The strings the IMF attaches to new cash infusions impact most strongly on the environment and the rural poor, usually women and children first. Larry Minear of Church World Service notes that "conditions often work against efforts by the people themselves to meet local needs." The pressure to increase export crops by mechanized farming often results in deforestation and soil erosion. Mohammed T. El-Ashry of the World Resources Institute has said,

> Massive environmental degradation is going on right now in the Sudan due to mechanized farming in the West and opening lands which should not have been opened to ploughing and tilling. As a result, you get basically short-term productivity.

Unfortunately, Sudanese farmers will be left with long-term destitution.

Similarly, the World Bank conditions its aid on things like changing the tax and tariff system, realigning exchange rates, and streamlining public enterprises. Without beginning to address issues like military spending and structural economic inequities which lead to conflict, none of the Bank's economic or developmental objectives can ever be achieved, no matter how many times the Sudanese devalue their currency.

The United Nations has received much attention for its diplomatic successes in other conflicts throughout the world. A bi-partisan effort has begun in the Senate to enlist the Secretary General as a mediator between the warring parties in the Sudan. Although this is a noble goal, a word of caution is needed. The U.N. has only been successful when both sides of the table have something to gain from peace. As long as foreign aid continues to flow in unconditioned on the achievement of peace, Sadiq el Mahdi has nothing to gain from any substantive agreement, and will delay interminably.

MYTH # 3: THE U.S NEEDS NAVAL ACCESS TO PORT SUDAN TO DETER ANY POSSIBLE SOVIET THREAT TO RED SEA SHIPPING LANES

Over the past decade and a half, the driving forces behind U.S. policy towards the Horn of Africa have been fear and containment. State and Defense Department strategists built the U.S. Central Command, in which Sudan and Somalia have been integral players, on the premise that the Soviet Union and its proxies in the region might at some point attempt to restrict the flow of Mid-East oil to the West.

Recent developments render these assumptions anachronistic. First, there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the Soviet Union will have to begin importing oil in the coming decade. Already Warsaw Pact countries are importing much of their fossil fuel requirements from Arab sources. This hardly makes for a scenario in which the Soviets would want to cut off a potentially major source for its energy needs. A recent case in point is the decision by the Soviets not to interfere with the U.S. reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf War.

Second, Soviet forces are in the process of disengaging from their Afghani quagmire, an original reason for the proliferation of military aid to Somalia and Sudan in the late seventies. South Yemen has greatly moderated its anti-West tendencies, and will begin to export oil in the early 1990's. In Ethiopia, Mengistu has recently called for improved relations with the United States, and has been told by his Soviet benefactors that the days of unlimited arms transfers are finished. The anti-West umbrella has folded.

Third, increasingly unstable and narrowly based regimes in Somalia and Sudan, once staunch and reliable U.S. allies, now present a greater threat to long-term U.S. interests than does the Soviet Union. The very presence of the Soviet Union in the region is threatened by Ethiopia's unwillingness to negotiate with the increasingly potent Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), an avowed opponent of military base rights for any outside power in the Dahlak Archipelago.

It seems that U.S. taxpayers and famine victims in the Sudan have at least one thing in common: they are both being used by their governments to acheive narrowly conceived military and economic goals which benefit only a select few.

MYTH # 4: WESTERN BILATERAL AID TO SUDAN COUNTERS LIBYAN EXPANSIONISM

As long as Prime Minister el Mahdi does not fear the possibility of a cut-off of assistance from the West, he feels free to impose his personally held Fundamentalist Islamic conviction on the country. El Mahdi conveniently cites as his excuse the strong influence of the Muslim Brotherhood in Khartoum and in his coalition government. This allows him to pursue a special relationship with Colonel Khadaffy, which places the U.S. in the peculiar position of vainly bidding for influence with Tripoli in both Sudan and Somalia.

It is obvious to observers outside the Beltway and the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum that Libya does not possess the resources to replace investment and aid that the West has to offer el Mahdi's government. So the absurd irony remains that Western aid not conditioned on a perceived need to decrease Libyan influence in fact paves the way for increased Libyan influence.

MYTH # 5: SUDAN'S ECONOMY IS STILL VIABLE

In an unsuccessful mid-December bid to induce el Mahdi to sign the SPLA-DUP peace agreement, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ken Brown offered the Prime Minister debt rescheduling on more favorable terms. What will this narrowly based government repay with - cotton? In a war economy? The answer to Sudan's debt and financial crisis lies in the slumbering economic giant of the South - gold, oil, chromium, and vast agricultural productive potential. But these resources cannot be forcibly taken (as Chevron and Jonglei Canal project workers found out) from the southerners. Southerners need to participate in defining the pace and benefit-sharing of the extensive development that will be undertaken after the war, and they must have a say in controlling the environmental impacts of development and mineral extraction, a matter in which the central government clearly has no interest.

MYTH # 6: THE U.S. IS DEFENDING A DEMOCRACY IN SUDAN

Democracy does indeed seem to exist for those in the Sudan who are not running from U.S. tanks and Libyan-supplied MIG-23s. Nevertheless, freedom of speech and the press are not so comfortably cherished in the presence of state-sponsored ethnic and religious discrimination, child slavery, intense civil war, and massive starvation and displacement.

MYTH # 8: THE SPLA IS THE PRIMARY OBSTACLE TO PEACE

With the signing of the SPLA-DUP peace accord, the only remaining opponents of a peaceful settlement to the conflict are the Muslim Brotherhood and el Mahdi's Umma Party, the two remaining members of the coalition government. El Mahdi's intransigence in not implementing the agreement has angered all elements of Sudanese society, and led to a renewed round of fighting in the field.

During my recent travels in Sudan, I found many Sudanese at all levels to be skeptical of the intentions of the Prime Minister regarding his commitment to any meaningful process of reconciliation with the SPLA. The following reasons constantly emerged: 1) El Mahdi believes he can win the war militarily by wearing down the SPLA and battering the South into submission through his use of hostile militias and hunger as weapons of war; 2) The atmosphere in the country is desirous of peace, meaning that el Mahdi and his privileged Umma Party would have the most to lose in an equitable settlement; 3) The Prime Minister privately wishes to reestablish the primacy of the Mahdi family, which freed the country form the Turko-Egyptian rule at the end of the last century; 4) In any lasting settlement, Islamic law would be ruled out as the basis for the legal code in the society; 5) The war gives el Mahdi and the Muslim Brotherhood financial and military support from radicalized factions in the Middle East which they would not receive if Islam was not "under attack", as the situation is portrayed effectively in certain circles; and 6) The war is very profitable for merchants, transport companies, and other commercial interests tied to the Umma Party which are making enormous amounts of money off of the relief efforts.

It is for these compelling reasons el Mahdi will not come to the negotiating table unless the continuance of his economic lifeline from the West is made conditional on the achievement of peace.

MYTH # 9: WAR CAUSES FAMINE

The war in Sudan could have been fought over the last few years with very limited deaths by starvation. The overwhelming bulk of the almost 300,000 who perished last year died because of specific tactics undertaken by the government and SPLA in their prosecution of the war.

Government forces have armed ethnic groups traditionally hostile to the Dinkas, the backbone of the SPLA, predictably causing widespread massacres of unarmed Dinka civilians. Food has been used cynically by both sides as a weapon of war, as have land mines to either trap people inside government garrison towns or keep them out in rebel-held territory. Reports of slavery are alleged against both the government and the SPLA. Civilian targets have been bombed and strafed as well.

More than any other in recent history, this famine was preventable. Yet the U.S. government was silent.

MYTH # 10: U.S. AND SOVIET INTERESTS ARE DIAMETRICALLY OPPOSED IN THE HORN REGION

Hostile policies of containment by both superpowers have resulted in far greater costs than benefits in Africa's Horn. Millions of lives and billions of dollars have bought nothing but instability. By defining security solely in terms of force levels and access to military bases instead of factoring in the promotion of just and equitable economic, social, and political structures, the U.S. and Soviets are left supporting unreliable, opportunistic, and increasingly oppressive governments in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia whose futures beyond tomorrow cannot be assured.

With a little foresight, it is possible to see that the Soviet Union and the U.S. would be better off working together in northeast Africa rather than continuing their rivalry. By directly negotiating agreements to jointly protect the Red Sea shipping lanes, they will find it unnecessary to continuously bail out untenable Horn governments. Access to oil would be more reliably assured, and the superpowers could be freed to push jointly for just resolutions of the conflicts damning the people of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Somalia to unending destitution.

Perestroika may not last forever. In the interest of ending human suffering, the U.S. and Soviets should place the Horn of Africa on the top of the list of regional issues to address over the coming year. Cooperation not only in ensuring mutual interests but also in famine relief and post-war reconstruction in all three countries could provide a model for future negotiations in other regions of the world. Outside parties which help create the conditions for war must learn to work cooperatively toward creating external conditions for sustainable peace.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS

Constructive engagement is worthless with a leader like Sadiq el Mahdi. Just as in South Africa, candles may be placed in the windows and a fresh coat of paint may be applied to the front door, but conditions inside the house will continue to deteriorate. As Sudan Times Editor Bona Malwal told me a couple of weeks ago, "The U.S. can say we don't want to continue supporting this intransigence and before they finish their sentence Sadiq would be looking for a pen to sign the peace agreement." It is in this spirit that I offer the following recommendations:

1. Condition all future U.S. assistance (except for humanitarian) to the Sudanese government on the implementation of the peace agreement negotiated by the DUP and the SPLA, on the development of plans to redress regional resource inequities, on the initiation of processes of decentralization of decision making, on the improvement of their human rights record, and on the reorientation of domestic budgets to decrease military spending and increase resources available for decentralized development.

2. Instruct the U.S. representatives to the U.N., World Bank, and IMF to work towards the same conditionalities in the interests of peace and future economic viability. As a start, human rights improvements can be encouraged in accordance with Section 701 of the International Financial Institutions Act.

3. Initiate planning for an internationally funded Post-War Reconstruction Fund to be held in escrow until this present or a future government meets the conditions outlined in Recommendation # 1. This Fund would support the building of local institutions to sustain peace.

4. Press for an international arms embargo of the region.

5. Recognize the mutual interests of the U.S. and Soviet Union in the free flow of oil. Begin negotiations directly with the Soviets to jointly protect the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden shipping lanes in order to render unnecessary the maintenance of base rights in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia. Work together with the Soviets in urging negotiated settlements to the conflicts in the Horn of Africa and in assisting civilians caught in the cross-fire.

6. Maximum participation of indigenous NGOs and community organizations should be enlisted in the battle to combat the rapid deterioration of the environment and increase the availability of locally produced foodstuffs.

7. Make a strong commitment of food and medicine to the cross-border operation in southern Sudan, encouraging expansion into areas north of Kapoeta. Make the provision of seeds and tools an immediate priority before the rains begin so some can begin to produce for themselves again and not be hostage to the government or SPLA relief operations as the sole options for survival.

UPHOLDING AMERICAN PRINCIPLES ABROAD

Candidate Bush constantly reiterated his desire throughout the campaign to see a "kinder, gentler nation" emerge under his stewardship. President Bush has the opportunity to take his own cue in response to the cries of the hungry and oppressed in the Sudan. The values which the United States was founded on are exactly those which the U.S. should be projecting in its foreign policy toward this divided country: freedom of religion and speech; constitutional protection of individual and ethnic rights; access to productive resources in order that parents can feed themselves and their children; democratic decision-making; and above all else, a government which will commit itself to a meaningful process of peace and reunification.

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify.